Nowakowski v. New York
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 15768
| 2d Cir. | 2016Background
- Nowakowski was convicted in New York Criminal Court of second-degree harassment (a statutory "violation") and ultimately sentenced on May 14, 2013 to a one-year conditional discharge requiring one day of community service (in lieu of a fine).
- He received a notice specifying a particular date/place for the community service, warning failure to appear could lead to a bench warrant.
- Nowakowski filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 1, 2013 (before completing the single day of service); he completed the service while the habeas was pending.
- The District Court dismissed the petition as moot after the conditional discharge expired, concluding Spencer v. Kemna barred continuing Article III standing absent concrete collateral consequences.
- The Second Circuit granted COA on two questions: (1) whether the conditional discharge + one day community service constituted being "in custody" for § 2254 at the time of filing; and (2) whether a presumption of continuing collateral consequences (Sibron) applies to a conviction classified by state law as a violation, so that mootness is avoided.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was petitioner "in custody" under § 2254 when he filed (given conditional discharge requiring one day of community service and potential arrest for noncompliance)? | Nowakowski argued the conditional discharge and the mandatory scheduled appearance for community service (with threat of warrant) restrained his liberty and satisfied § 2254 custody. | State suggested the sentence was minor and ultimately converted from fine at petitioner’s request; argued no custody supporting habeas. | Held: Yes. Physical confinement is not required; restraints requiring appearance at specific times/places and exposing petitioner to arrest or revocation suffice as "in custody." |
| Does the Sibron presumption of continuing collateral consequences apply to a New York "violation" conviction (not formally labeled a "crime")? | Nowakowski (and majority) argued that federal analysis of whether an adjudication is "criminal" controls; New York prosecutes violations in its criminal procedure code and allows jail (up to 15 days), so the conviction is criminal for Sibron purposes. | Government urged that violation-level adjudications are too minor and that the Sibron presumption should not extend to non-crimes/ petty offenses. | Held: Yes. The court treated the violation as criminal for Sibron purposes (looking to state scheme and Kennedy/Mendoza‑Martinez factors) and applied the presumption. |
| If the Sibron presumption applies, who must bear the burden and what is the standard to rebut it? | Nowakowski argued presumption should keep case live once invoked; petitioner need only identify a possible collateral consequence. | Government argued it should be able to show no continuing consequences; burden allocation debated. | Held: The presumption is rebuttable. Petitioner must identify at least one possible collateral consequence; then the state must prove there is "no possibility" such consequences will attach (court adopts framework from Sibron/Spencer, but recognizes practical limits). |
| Did petitioner identify sufficient continuing collateral consequences to avoid mootness (e.g., impeachment in future proceedings; Heck bar to § 1983)? | Nowakowski pointed to the risk his conviction could be used to impeach him in future proceedings and could preclude his § 1983 claim under Heck. | Government relied on Spencer to say impeachment/Heck are insufficient here; argued collateral consequences are speculative or nonexistent for a petty violation. | Held: Yes as to impeachment. The court found impeachment a sufficient continuing collateral consequence under the Sibron presumption and therefore the petition was not moot; it declined to definitively resolve the Heck argument. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (articulates presumption that criminal convictions ordinarily carry continuing collateral legal consequences for mootness analysis)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998) (limits and explains Sibron presumption; requires concrete continuing collateral consequences once sentence expires; presumption applies to criminal convictions but not to parole revocations)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (bar to § 1983 suits that would necessarily invalidate an outstanding conviction)
- Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (habeas jurisdiction can extend beyond physical confinement to other restraints on liberty)
- Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (recognizes custody where freedom of movement rests with judicial officers and failure to appear could cause incarceration)
- Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (sentence expiration does not automatically render collateral- consequence challenges moot when substantial disabilities remain)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza‑Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (Kennedy factors for determining whether a statutory scheme is punitive/criminal for constitutional analysis)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (functional inquiry into punitive versus civil nature of state sanctions)