Notz v. Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities
438 F.Supp.3d 148
D. Conn.2020Background
- Plaintiff Mica Notz is a non-attorney advocate who for years represented parties before the EEOC and CHRO; in October 2016 CHRO informed Notz it would no longer permit non-attorney representatives in CHRO proceedings.
- Notz was representing vulnerable clients who would be unrepresented absent counsel; she objected that the CHRO policy conflicted with Connecticut regulations.
- In May 2017 the Connecticut Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel opened an investigation into Notz for unauthorized practice of law and ordered her to cease such representation.
- Notz pursued administrative communications with CHRO, Disciplinary Counsel, and the Attorney General’s office from 2017–2019 and then filed this pro se federal suit on May 21, 2019.
- The complaint asserted six counts: five state-law claims (e.g., violations of Connecticut administrative law) and one federal claim alleging CHRO’s policy is preempted by federal law because the EEOC permits non-attorney representation; CHRO moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Federal-question jurisdiction over preemption claim | Notz contends CHRO policy is preempted by federal EEOC rules, so federal courts have jurisdiction to enjoin the state agency | CHRO argued the preemption claim fails to state a viable federal claim and thus lacks jurisdiction | Court: Federal-question jurisdiction exists for preemption/injunctive claim under Supremacy Clause; jurisdiction proper under §1331 |
| Merits of federal preemption | EEOC regulations and work-share agreements effectively permit non-attorney representation, so CHRO must allow it | CHRO argues EEOC rules cited do not require non-attorney representation before CHRO or in most EEOC contexts; no federal regulation authorizes such representation in state CHRO proceedings | Court: Notz failed to plead plausible federal preemption; dismissed preemption claim for failure to state a claim |
| Scope of EEOC regulations as basis for preemption | 29 C.F.R. provisions permit representation/filing by non-attorneys, implying broader preemption | CHRO: cited EEOC rules are limited in scope (e.g., Part 1614 applies to federal employees) and do not compel CHRO policy changes | Court: EEOC regs relied upon do not support a preemption theory here; Sperry distinguished; no federal requirement shown |
| State-law claims and supplemental jurisdiction | Notz seeks declaratory/injunctive relief and state-law remedies against CHRO | CHRO moved to dismiss federal and state claims; argued no federal claim exists to support jurisdiction | Court: Declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims under 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3) and dismissed remaining counts without prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (federal courts have jurisdiction to enjoin state regulation as preempted by federal law)
- Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (federal regulation authorizing non-attorney patent agents preempted state regulation of practice before Patent Office)
- Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320 (2015) (equitable relief available when federal law preempts state regulatory actions)
- Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015) (framework for preemption analysis)
- Cable Television Ass’n of New York, Inc. v. Finneran, 954 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1992) (federal-question jurisdiction for preemption challenge to state regulation)
- Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island Inc., 711 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2013) (factors for declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims)
- Tiberio v. Allergy Asthma Immunology of Rochester, 664 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2011) (scope of 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 limitations)
- City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to United Nations, 618 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2010) (agency regulations may preempt state law if within delegated authority)
- Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399 (2d Cir. 2013) (pro se pleadings construed liberally)