Nottingham v. State
135 A.3d 541
| Md. Ct. Spec. App. | 2016Background
- In Jan 2013 in an Ocean City bar, George Nottingham and Michael Post fought after a dispute over a cell phone; Nottingham delivered a single punch outside that knocked Post, who hit his head and died.
- Nottingham was originally indicted for second-degree assault and involuntary manslaughter; first trial ended in a mistrial; State later nol-prossed that indictment and obtained a new one adding reckless endangerment, intoxication, and affray.
- At retrial the jury convicted Nottingham of involuntary manslaughter, second-degree assault, reckless endangerment, and affray (acquitting on intoxication); court sentenced him to 7 years for manslaughter, concurrent 5-year terms for others.
- Nottingham appealed, arguing (1) the trial court erred in the jury instruction for affray by omitting the element that the fight be “to the terror of the people,” and (2) the State violated his speedy-trial right by nol-prossing and re‑indicting to delay retrial.
- The Court of Special Appeals concluded the affray instruction was legally incorrect because it omitted the “terror to the people” element, and that omission was not harmless as to affray; but the error did not taint assault, reckless endangerment, or manslaughter convictions. The speedy-trial claim was rejected.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury instruction for affray was legally sufficient | Nottingham: court erred by omitting element that fighting must be “to the terror of the people” | State: under Dashiell, fighting in a public place ipso facto satisfies terror element, so omission harmless | Court: Instruction was legally incorrect—"terror to the people" is a separate element and must be instructed |
| Whether evidence generated an affray instruction | Nottingham: insufficient evidence of terror to public (and did not preserve mutual combat claim) | State: bar fight in presence of patrons/bartender produced sufficient evidence of terror to the people | Court: Evidence supported giving an affray instruction (terror element was contested but reasonably generated by the facts) |
| Whether omission of terror element was harmless error | Nottingham: omission was prejudicial because terror element was contested and part of the instruction | State: affray evidence (public fight) made omission harmless | Court: Under Neder/Chapman standard, omission was not harmless beyond reasonable doubt; vacated affray conviction |
| Whether Nol Prosequi and re-indictment violated speedy-trial right | Nottingham: State opportunistically delayed trial by dismissing and recharging, prejudicing his right | State: acted in good faith; speedy-trial clock restarts at new indictment | Court: Implicit finding State acted in good faith; delay from new indictment (~2 months at motion date) was not presumptively prejudicial; speedy-trial claim denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Dashiell v. State, 214 Md. App. 684 (clarifies affray elements and relation of public-place and terror-to-the-people elements)
- Hickman v. State, 193 Md. App. 238 (recognizes affray as viable common-law offense in Maryland and as a public‑peace crime)
- Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (omission of an element from jury instruction reviewed under harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (four‑factor balancing test for Sixth Amendment speedy‑trial claims)
- State v. Henson, 335 Md. 326 (when State acts in good faith to dismiss and refile, speedy‑trial clock restarts at new indictment)
- Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (delay ordinarily triggers speedy‑trial inquiry when it approaches one year)