Norton v. United States, Civil Action No. 2021-0724

Norton worked at the 2019 White House Easter Egg Roll on the South Lawn; while on a break she tripped on an unsecured cord and suffered injuries requiring surgery.
She was recruited through a friend and a private events contractor (Full Moon/Coca‑Cola); she was paid $202.50 by a private company (Rosedale) and wore a badge labeled "Vendor." She did not sign any NPS volunteer agreement and did not know about the parties’ written Agreement designating unpaid reps as Volunteers in the Parks.
The Parties (NPS, White House, White House Historical Association, etc.) had an Agreement stating unpaid representatives shall be "Volunteers in the Parks" under 54 U.S.C. §102301; Defendant argues that under that statute FECA makes FECA compensation the exclusive remedy, ousting FTCA jurisdiction.
Norton sued the United States under the FTCA for negligence in maintaining the grounds; Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction, contending FECA provides Norton’s exclusive remedy.
The court analyzed statutory text, legislative history, and NPS policy guidance and found the complaint (as pleaded) does not show Norton was recruited, trained, and accepted by NPS nor that she performed "interpretive" or similar visitor services; the Agreement cannot amend the statute.
Holding: the court denied the government’s motion to dismiss, concluding FECA did not, at this stage, strip FTCA jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Norton was an "employee" under FECA because she was a "volunteer" under 54 U.S.C. §102301, thereby making FECA the exclusive remedy and ousting FTCA jurisdiction	Norton was not an NPS volunteer: she was recruited by a private contractor, paid by a private company, wore a vendor badge, never signed a volunteer agreement, and performed non‑interpretive, non‑visitor‑service duties	The Parties’ Agreement and the Volunteers‑in‑Parks statute treat unpaid/event workers as "volunteers" who are "employees" for FECA purposes, so FECA is Norton’s exclusive remedy	Denied dismissal: at this stage Norton has not shown she was recruited/trained/accepted by NPS or performed interpretive/visitor services required by §102301; FECA does not plainly apply
Whether the Parties’ Agreement could determine Norton’s status as a statutory volunteer	Agreement irrelevant to statutory status; Norton did not know or sign it	Agreement demonstrates parties intended unpaid reps to be volunteers under the statute	Court: contractual designation cannot override statutory text; Agreement does not resolve whether Norton meets the statute’s elements

Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003) (statutory text controls; courts should avoid strained constructions)
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (do not render statutory modifiers superfluous)
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) (every word of a statute must have operative effect if possible)
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980) (start with statutory text in interpretation)
Coalition for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (district courts may consider the complaint plus undisputed record facts on jurisdictional motions)
Amgen, Inc. v. Smith, 357 F.3d 103 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (apply noscitur a sociis to construe words by their context)
Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151 (1991) (a statute's plain meaning controls even if Congress did not foresee all consequences)