Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc.
409 P.3d 331
Colo.2018Background
- Jane E. Norton (former CDPHE Executive Director) sued Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, the Governor, and state health officials under Colo. Const. art. V, § 50, claiming state funds to RMPP indirectly subsidized an affiliate that performs abortions.
- Norton alleged the State paid roughly $14 million to RMPP for non‑abortion services; RMPP then subsidized Services Corp. (which provides abortions) via below‑market rent and shared resources.
- Norton sought declaratory and injunctive relief and alleged unjust enrichment against RMPP; the trial court dismissed under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim.
- The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, holding § 50 requires analysis of the purpose of the State payment and that an attenuated subsidization theory is insufficient.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the dismissal, holding a claimant must plead that the State paid (directly or indirectly through an intermediary) to compensate an entity for performing an induced abortion and that such an abortion was actually performed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a complaint alleging indirect subsidization (state pays affiliate for non‑abortion services which subsidizes an abortion provider) states a claim under Colo. Const. art. V, § 50 | Norton: Any public funds paid to an entity that enables an affiliate to perform abortions are "indirect" payments prohibited by § 50 | State/defendants: § 50 forbids payments made to obtain or compensate for the performance of an induced abortion; mere subsidization for other services is too attenuated | Held: Complaint insufficient — claimant must plead the State paid (directly or via an intermediary) to compensate for performing an abortion and that such an abortion occurred |
| Meaning of "directly or indirectly" in § 50 | Norton: "Indirectly" bars funding entities that offer or are affiliated with abortion providers regardless of payment purpose | Defendants/Majority: "Indirectly" covers intermediary payment chains but still requires the payment be for the purpose of obtaining abortion services | Held: "Directly or indirectly" permits intermediary theories only where the ultimate payment is made to obtain abortion services |
Key Cases Cited
- Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083 (Colo. 2011) (standard of review for C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motions and accepting complaint facts as true)
- Keim v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 397 P.3d 377 (Colo. 2017) (interpreting "directly or indirectly" to allow intermediary theories where the ultimate recipient receives the thing of value)
- Urbish v. Lamm, 761 P.2d 756 (Colo. 1988) (constitutional language given natural and popular meaning)
- Gessler v. Colorado Common Cause, 327 P.3d 232 (Colo. 2014) (constitutional interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Warne v. Hall, 373 P.3d 588 (Colo. 2016) (pleading standards at motion to dismiss stage)