Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc
2016 COA 3
Colo. Ct. App.2016Background
- Plaintiff Jane E. Norton, a Colorado resident and taxpayer, sued Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood (PP) and state officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, unjust enrichment, and a constructive trust based on Colo. Const. art. V, § 50 (prohibiting public funds to pay or reimburse for induced abortions).
- Norton alleges PP is affiliated with a services entity (Services) that performs abortions, that PP charged Services below‑market rent, and that state payments to PP therefore directly or indirectly subsidized abortions.
- Norton previously caused the State to terminate funding to PP in 2001 after an audit; she alleges payments resumed about 2009 and seeks to void contracts and recover funds paid since then.
- The district court found Norton had standing; the court dismissed her complaint under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim after considering evidence submitted with the motion (temporarily treated as summary judgment material).
- On appeal, the Court of Appeals reviewed de novo whether the complaint alleged a cognizable § 50 violation and affirmed the dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether state payments to PP violated Colo. Const. art. V, § 50 | Norton: payments to PP indirectly subsidized Services’ abortions (via below‑market rent) so funds were used for abortions in violation of § 50 | State/PP: § 50 forbids payments made for the purpose of paying for induced abortions; payments were for non‑abortion services (e.g., screenings, visits) | Held: § 50 focuses on the payor’s purpose; Norton did not allege payments were made for performance of abortions, so no § 50 violation |
| Whether the words “directly or indirectly” in § 50 reach downstream use by payee | Norton: “directly or indirectly” means funds that ultimately are used to subsidize abortions are prohibited | State/PP: those words modify the act of paying/reimbursing and concern the payor’s action, not subsequent use by payee | Held: “directly or indirectly” pertains to how the State pays/reimburses, not how payee later uses funds; Norton’s interpretation would lead to absurd, overly attenuated results |
| Whether dismissal without leave to amend was proper after evidentiary submissions | Norton: additional discovery or amendment could support claim | State/PP: complaint facially fails to state claim; evidence shows payments were for non‑abortion services; amendment/discovery cannot cure defect | Held: dismissal without leave to amend proper because pleadings and evidence show no plausible § 50 claim; further discovery unwarranted |
Key Cases Cited
- Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter, 255 P.3d 1083 (Colo. 2011) (standards for de novo review of dismissal and accepting complaint allegations)
- Dorman v. Petrol Aspen, Inc., 914 P.2d 909 (Colo. 1996) (function of a rule 12(b)(5) dismissal testing complaint sufficiency)
- Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 908 P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1995) (complaint must give defendant notice of the transaction or occurrence sued upon)
- Field v. Sisters of Mercy of Colo., 245 P.2d 1167 (Colo. 1952) (even at summary judgment stage, pleaded facts must be sufficient on their face to sustain a cause of action)
- W.O. Brisben Cos. v. Krystkowiak, 66 P.3d 133 (Colo. App. 2002) (leave to amend denied where evidence shows no possibility of stating viable claim)