530 F.Supp.3d 790
D. Minnesota2021Background
- Plaintiffs: two churches and a pastor (Faith-Based Plaintiffs) and several small businesses and owners (Business Plaintiffs) challenged Minnesota Governor Walz’s COVID-19 executive orders (primarily EO 20-74). Defendants: Gov. Tim Walz (sued individually and in official capacity) and AG Keith Ellison (official capacity).
- EO 20-74: houses of worship limited to 50% capacity with a 250-person cap (barbers/ cosmetology treated similarly); some public accommodations limited to 25% of occupancy (max 250); “Critical” businesses received more favorable treatment; Non-Critical businesses subject to sanitation/social-distancing rules.
- Claims: Free Exercise (First Amendment and Minnesota Constitution), Free Speech & Assembly (First Amendment), Equal Protection (Fourteenth Amendment), and Takings (Fifth Amendment). Relief sought: declaratory, injunctive, and monetary damages.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing, Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity (and Pennhurst limitation), qualified immunity (individual-capacity), abstention (Pullman/Colorado River), and failure to state claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
- Disposition (motion to dismiss granted in part, denied in part): official-capacity defendants immune to retroactive/monetary and state-law claims; Ex parte Young allows prospective/injunctive federal relief against officials; Governor shielded by qualified immunity from money damages; Plaintiffs’ Free-Exercise and Assembly claims survive; Free-Speech, Equal-Protection, and Takings claims dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing (traceability, redressability) | Plaintiffs say EOs caused concrete harms to worship and businesses and injunction/damages would redress them | Defendants say harms are not fairly traceable and relief may not redress because patrons could stay home | Standing satisfied: traceability and redressability met; motion denied on this ground |
| Eleventh Amendment / Ex parte Young | Seek prospective injunctive relief against officials to enjoin enforcement of EOs | Defendants assert sovereign immunity for official-capacity claims | Official-capacity defendants immune to retrospective/monetary/state-law relief; Ex parte Young permits prospective relief against Walz and Ellison at motion-to-dismiss stage |
| Pennhurst (state-law claims) | Plaintiffs seek state-law declarations about Governor/AG authority | Defendants invoke Pennhurst to bar federal adjudication of state-law claims against state officials | State-law claims against officials dismissed under Pennhurst |
| Qualified immunity (Walz individual) | Plaintiffs say constitutional rights were violated | Defendants say no clearly established law; pandemic context made duties unclear | Governor Walz entitled to qualified immunity from money damages; individual-capacity damages dismissed |
| Abstention (Pullman and Colorado River) | Plaintiffs oppose abstention; federal court should decide federal constitutional claims | Defendants urge abstention because state courts are resolving related statutory-authority questions | Abstention denied: Pullman improper (no identified ambiguous statute); Colorado River not warranted (state cases not parallel or dispositive) |
| Free Exercise (Count One) | EO singled out religion compared to similarly situated secular activities; strict scrutiny required | EO is neutral/general or treats religion like similar secular businesses; rational basis suffices | Free-exercise claim survives at motion-to-dismiss; court declines to dismiss pending factual record |
| Free Speech & Assembly (Count Two) | Religious speech/assembly restricted by EOs | Defendants say regulations are valid public-health measures | Free-speech claim dismissed for conclusory pleading; assembly claim survives (not specifically disposed) |
| Equal Protection (Count Three) | EOs discriminate between similarly situated entities without rational justification | Defendants contend distinctions are rational and plaintiffs not similarly situated | Equal-protection claim dismissed for failure to plead similarly situated comparators |
| Takings (Count Four) | Temporary closures and capacity limits deprived businesses of property value/uses | Defendants say orders were temporary public-health measures, not categorical or compensable regulatory takings | Takings claim dismissed: no categorical taking; Penn Central balancing favors government; claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requirements)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013) (speculative chain of causation and injury analysis)
- Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (prospective injunctive relief against state officials despite Eleventh Amendment)
- Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (limits on federal courts hearing state-law claims against state officials)
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity framework)
- Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (application of traditional First Amendment scrutiny to COVID restrictions)
- Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (neutrality and general applicability in Free Exercise analysis)
- Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (public-health deference historically invoked in emergency measures)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (Rule 12 plausibility standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standards; legal conclusions not accepted as true)
- Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (categorical takings rule)
- Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (Penn Central regulatory-taking balancing test)
- Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (temporary moratoria generally not categorical takings)
- First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (compensation required when government denies all use for extended period)
- Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (physical appropriation and government use context for takings)
