Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted
831 F.3d 686
| 6th Cir. | 2016Background
- A 2010 federal consent decree (NEOCH Decree) required Ohio to count certain provisional ballots (SSN-4 and wrong-precinct due to poll-worker error); Decree ran through June 30, 2013.
- In 2012 Ohio officials (Husted/State) sought to vacate the Decree and the Ohio legislature leaders separately sought state-court relief; plaintiffs (NEOCH and SEIU Local 1) moved to enjoin collateral state-court attacks and to obtain injunctive relief protecting voters’ provisional ballots.
- The district court denied Defendants’ motion to vacate, enjoined the state-court challenge, and issued a preliminary injunction (later partly reversed and partly affirmed by this court) requiring counting of correct-location/wrong-precinct provisional ballots caused by poll-worker error; a permanent injunction and a one-cycle extension of the Decree (to Dec. 31, 2016) followed.
- Plaintiffs moved under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for attorneys’ fees for work in 2012–2013 (defending the Decree, securing/defending the injunctions, and obtaining the extension); the district court awarded lodestar fees for 6,147 hours (~$2.23M) but applied Coulter’s 3% cap to fees-for-fees.
- Defendants appealed the reasonableness of hours and rates; Plaintiffs cross-appealed the 3% Coulter cap. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the hours, vacated the rates for certain Altshuler Berzon (out-of-state) attorneys, abrogated Coulter’s 3% presumptive cap, and remanded for recalculation of fees-for-fees and explanation of out-of-town rates.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reasonableness of hours awarded under § 1988/lodestar | Hours were necessary given complex, expedited election litigation; detailed billing records support reasonableness | Hours (6,000+) excessive, duplicative, block-billed, and billed by too many attorneys/travel time | Affirmed district court: hours reasonable; deference given to district court’s familiarity and detailed records; no abuse of discretion |
| Reasonableness of hourly rates (local vs out-of-town counsel) | Rates reflect skill, experience, and market for complex election litigation; declared comparators provided | Many awarded rates exceed prevailing local market; out-of-town rates (Altshuler Berzon) were excessive | Mostly affirmed for local Ohio counsel; vacated and remanded for explanation/recalculation of Altshuler Berzon attorneys’ rates (district court must justify higher out-of-town rates) |
| Recoverability and cap on fees for litigating fee application ("fees-for-fees") | Fees-for-fees are fully compensable under § 1988; Coulter cap is inconsistent with Supreme Court authority | Coulter rule (3%/5% cap) should limit fees-for-fees to prevent protracted fee litigation and encourage settlement | Sixth Circuit abrogated Coulter’s 3%/5% presumptive caps as inconsistent with Jean and Hensley; remanded to allow district court to determine reasonable fees-for-fees under lodestar/reasonableness principles |
| Whether Coulter remains binding Sixth Circuit precedent after Jean | Coulter should be abandoned because Jean and Hensley require treating fees-for-fees under the same reasonableness framework | Coulter remains controlling circuit precedent limiting fees-for-fees | Court concluded Jean undermines Coulter; exercised authority to abrogate Coulter in light of intervening Supreme Court precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (principles of lodestar and exclusion of hours not reasonably expended)
- Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (lodestar—reasonable hourly rate standard)
- Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (EAJA — fees-for-fees must be evaluated under Hensley reasonableness; reject treating fee-litigation differently)
- Coulter v. Tennessee, 805 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. rule imposing 3%/5% caps on fees-for-fees)
- Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (district court must provide reasonably specific explanation for fee determinations)
- Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. decision affirming many district-court rulings on Decree and preliminary injunction)