North Carolina State Bar v. Tillett
369 N.C. 264
| N.C. | 2016Background
- Judge Jerry R. Tillett, a sitting Superior Court judge, was investigated by the Judicial Standards Commission (JSC) and accepted a public reprimand for conduct toward Kill Devil Hills officials and the local District Attorney while acting in his judicial capacity.
- The JSC found Tillett used judicial stationery and chambers to pressure officials, issued an order on his own initiative for personnel records, and continued involvement after recusal, creating a public perception of conflict and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
- Two years after the JSC reprimand, the North Carolina State Bar filed a disciplinary complaint with the Disciplinary Hearing Commission (DHC) alleging multiple violations of Rule 8.4(d) based on the same events.
- Tillett moved to dismiss for lack of DHC jurisdiction; the DHC denied the motion and the question reached the North Carolina Supreme Court by certiorari.
- The Supreme Court held that, under the Constitution and Article 30 (Chapter 7A), jurisdiction to discipline sitting judges for conduct while in office rests exclusively with the JSC and the Supreme Court, not with the State Bar/DHC, and ordered dismissal with prejudice of the State Bar’s complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State Bar/DHC may discipline a sitting judge for conduct performed while acting as a judge | The State Bar: judges remain lawyers; §7A-410 and the bar’s disciplinary authority imply the DHC can discipline judges for attorney-professional violations, including Rule 8.4(d) | Tillett: Article IV §17(2) plus Article 30 (Ch. 7A) give the JSC and the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction over discipline for conduct while serving as judge | Held: DHC lacks jurisdiction to discipline a sitting judge for conduct while in office; JSC and Supreme Court have exclusive authority; State Bar complaint must be dismissed with prejudice. |
| Whether §7A-410 (removal upon disbarment) implies DHC jurisdiction over sitting judges | State Bar: §7A-410 would be meaningless if DHC lacked power to discipline sitting judges | Court: §7A-410 simply addresses the consequence when a judge is disbarred (e.g., for pre-judicial conduct) and does not confer DHC jurisdiction over conduct while serving as judge | Held: §7A-410 does not authorize DHC to discipline sitting judges for judicial conduct. |
| Whether prior JSC discipline bars State Bar action (issue left undecided) | State Bar: may still proceed despite prior JSC action | Tillett: collateral estoppel / fairness concerns (argued in concurrence) | Court: did not decide estoppel or due process issues; resolved case on jurisdictional grounds only. |
Key Cases Cited
- Baker v. Varser, 240 N.C. 260 (recognizing legislative purpose of State Bar discipline to improve administration of justice)
- In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109 (discussing creation of JSC and Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction in judicial discipline)
- In re Hayes, 356 N.C. 389 (describing JSC as arm of the Court and Supreme Court’s final authority)
- In re Renfer, 345 N.C. 632 (confirming original jurisdiction over judge discipline in Supreme Court)
- N.C. State Bar v. Ethridge, 188 N.C. App. 653 (Court of Appeals upholding DHC discipline for conduct that occurred before a lawyer became a judge)
- In re Badgett, 362 N.C. 202 (JSC/Supreme Court disciplinary proceedings against a judge)
- Chambers v. Central Committee of Oklahoma Bar Ass’n, 203 Okla. 583 (discussed in concurrence: lawyer disciplinary bodies should not discipline sitting judges to protect judicial independence)
- Ala. State Bar ex rel. Steiner v. Moore, 282 Ala. 562 (discussed in concurrence: policy reasons for shielding judges from lawyer discipline)