Norris v. Kansas Employment Security Board of Review
303 Kan. 834
| Kan. | 2016Background
- Patricia Norris resigned from Air and Fire Systems (Aug 1, 2011), applied for unemployment benefits, and was ultimately denied through examiner, referee, and Board review; the Board mailed its decision affirming the referee on Feb 14, 2012.
- KESL (then) provided that a Board action becomes final 16 days after mailing unless judicial review is filed; KJRA provided 30 days to file a petition for judicial review (or 30 days after resolution of reconsideration).
- Norris' counsel requested Board reconsideration (executive secretary replied Mar 6, 2012) instead of immediately filing in district court; counsel then filed a petition for judicial review on Mar 21, 2012 (36 days after Board mailing).
- The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the petition exceeded the 16-day KESL finality period and the 30-day KJRA filing deadline; the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court granted review.
- The Supreme Court held that (under the statutes as they existed at the time of dismissal) the Board could entertain a motion for reconsideration, Norris’ motion was timely within the 16-day window, and her judicial-review petition (filed Mar 21) was timely because the KJRA’s 30-day clock started when the Board’s March 6 communication issued a final order.
- After the appeal, the legislature amended K.S.A. 44-709(i) to bar Board reconsideration after mailing and to equate the 16-day finality period with the petition deadline; the Supreme Court ruled this amendment did not apply retroactively to Norris.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Norris’ motion for Board reconsideration tolled or affected the timing for judicial review | Norris: filing a motion for reconsideration is permitted and timely under KESL; it prevented the Board decision from being final and delayed the 30-day KJRA clock | Board: K.S.A. 44-709(i) sets a 16-day finality that does not permit Board reconsideration to extend time to file in court | Held: The Board may entertain reconsideration; Norris’ motion was within the 16-day window and made the Board’s final order (Mar 6) the event that started the KJRA 30-day clock, so her petition was timely and district court had jurisdiction |
| Proper interplay between KESL finality provision and KJRA filing deadlines | Norris: KJRA contemplates reconsideration and its 30-day period starts after final order following reconsideration or denial | Board: KESL’s 16-day finality controls and bars later judicial filing if not within 16 days | Held: KESL incorporates KJRA; when reconsideration is requested, KJRA governs start of judicial-review period, so filing was timely under existing law |
| Whether the 2015 statutory amendment to K.S.A. 44-709(i) applies retroactively to bar Norris’ claim | Norris: amendment should not retroactively destroy vested right to seek review under prior law | Board: amendment procedural and should apply retroactively | Held: Amendment would abrogate a substantive right Norris had when district court dismissed; statute does not apply retroactively here |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Herring, 297 Kan. 847 (jurisdictional questions reviewed unlimitedly)
- In re A.M.M.-H., 300 Kan. 532 (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Transam Trucking, Inc. v. Kansas Dept. of Human Resources, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1117 (mailing rules and administrative-finality principles)
- State v. Williams, 291 Kan. 554 (general rule on prospective application of statutes)
- Brennan v. Kansas Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 293 Kan. 446 (distinguishing procedural vs. substantive statutes for retroactivity)
- Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fleischer, 257 Kan. 360 (factors for vested-rights/retroactivity analysis)
- Owen Lumber Co. v. Chartrand, 276 Kan. 218 (limits on retrospective application when rights effectively abrogated)