Norris Alexander a/k/a Norris Crawford Alexander a/k/a Bugger v. State of Mississippi, 333 So.3d 19

Background

In 1998 Norris Alexander was convicted of capital murder for a 1993 killing committed when he was 17 and was sentenced as a habitual offender to life without parole based on two 1997 felony convictions.
After Miller v. Alabama, Alexander sought resentencing; the trial court vacated his sentence and set a Miller hearing but denied motions requesting public funds for a mitigation investigator ($10,000) and an adolescent-developmental psychologist ($30,000).
The Miller hearing (2019) included only two State witnesses; Alexander presented no mitigation evidence and the trial court applied Miller factors and reimposed life without parole under Mississippi Code § 99-19-81.
The Court of Appeals vacated the habitual-life sentence, holding the denial of expert funds rendered the Miller hearing fundamentally unfair under Ake; the State sought certiorari.
The Mississippi Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court’s sentence, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying expert funding; a dissent would have affirmed the Court of Appeals.

Issues

Issue	Alexander's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court erred in denying funds for a mitigation investigator and adolescent-development psychologist	Denial prevented development of mitigation evidence required by Miller and rendered the hearing fundamentally unfair; Ake entitles indigent defendants to necessary expert assistance	Expert funding is discretionary; Alexander failed to make a concrete, particularized showing of substantial need; Ake does not automatically require funds absent State psychiatric evidence	No abuse of discretion. Trial court properly denied funds because Alexander gave only general/speculative reasons and the State presented no psychiatric evidence against him; denial did not violate due process
Whether the court had to resolve separately that Alexander was a ‘‘permanently incorrigible’’ juvenile before imposing LWOP	Miller protects juveniles and requires procedure to show membership in protected class; Alexander was prevented from proving lack of incorrigibility by lack of expert funding	Miller (and subsequent precedent) requires individualized consideration of youth but does not require a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility	No. Miller requires consideration of youth factors but does not mandate a separate finding of permanent incorrigibility; trial court sufficiently applied Miller factors
Whether Alexander had a right to a jury determination before imposition of LWOP as a juvenile/habitual offender	Any fact exposing defendant to greater punishment must be submitted to a jury (Apprendi/Hurst); thus a jury must decide whether he is the rare juvenile warranting LWOP	Prior convictions and habitual-offender status are exceptions to Apprendi; Miller factors are sentencing considerations, not elements	No. Habitual-offender status and prior convictions need not be jury-determined; Miller factors are not elements that must be decided by a jury

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (Miller requires sentencers to consider youth and attendant characteristics before imposing LWOP on juveniles)
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (Jones clarified Miller does not require a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility)
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (due process may require state to provide expert assistance to indigent defendants when the defendant’s case necessitates it)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (facts that increase penalty must be submitted to a jury, except prior convictions)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement of incorrigibility)
Parker v. State, 119 So. 3d 987 (Mississippi adoption/interpretation of Miller factors for juvenile sentencing)