Norman v. State, 156 A.3d 940

Background

Trooper Dancho stopped a vehicle at night for a broken taillight; three occupants: driver Robinson, front passenger Norman (petitioner), and rear passenger Braham.
Dancho smelled a strong odor of fresh marijuana from the passenger compartment, called for backup, and ordered all occupants out to search the vehicle.
Before searching the car, Dancho frisked (pat‑down) each occupant; during the frisk of Norman he felt packaged items in a pocket and a bag of marijuana fell out; a later search of the vehicle and Norman produced additional marijuana.
Norman moved to suppress arguing the odor alone did not give reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk him; the State argued the odor supported an inference of a joint drug enterprise and thus a risk of guns.
The circuit court denied suppression; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Maryland Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed, holding an odor of marijuana alone (in a multi‑occupant vehicle) does not justify frisking occupants absent additional facts.

Issues

Issue	Norman's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether odor of marijuana from a vehicle with multiple occupants alone gives reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk passengers	Odor alone is insufficient; must be additional, individualized facts suggesting the particular occupant is armed and dangerous	Odor permits a reasonable inference of a joint drug enterprise, and drugs are often accompanied by guns, so frisk is justified	Held: No — odor alone does not give reasonable articulable suspicion to frisk occupants; frisk requires additional circumstances tying the particular occupant to danger
Whether Robinson v. State (odor = probable cause to search vehicle) controls frisks of persons	Odor → probable cause to search vehicle but not to frisk persons without more	Odor’s indication of contraband supports inference occupants engaged in distribution and thus may be armed	Held: Robinson is limited — odor provides probable cause to search the vehicle but does not, by itself, authorize frisking individual occupants
Whether Wallace and Pringle alter the analysis for frisking passengers when drugs are suspected	Wallace supports requiring a link between passenger and contraband before searching/frisking	State reads Pringle to allow inference of common enterprise among occupants	Held: Pringle (probable cause to arrest based on known location of contraband) does not undermine Wallace; absence of evidence linking a particular passenger to contraband means frisk unsupported
Whether courts (including Fourth Circuit) have created a rule permitting frisks whenever drugs are suspected in multi‑occupant vehicles	Argues against adopting such a presumption; courts must look to totality and individualized facts	Cites cases (e.g., Sakyi, Rooks) holding frisk permissible where drugs reasonably suspected and other facts present	Held: Declines to adopt a presumption; follows totality‑of‑circumstances requiring specific facts indicating the individual is armed and dangerous

Key Cases Cited

Robinson v. State, 451 Md. 94 (Md. 2017) (odor of marijuana gives probable cause to search a vehicle despite decriminalization of small amounts)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (frisk requires reasonable, articulable suspicion that person is armed and dangerous)
Pringle v. State, 540 U.S. 366 (U.S. 2003) (circumstances may support inference of common enterprise among vehicle occupants when contraband’s location is known)
Wallace v. State, 372 Md. 137 (Md. 2002) (canine alert or other vehicle‑level indication of drugs alone is insufficient to search or frisk a particular passenger absent a link to that passenger)
Sakyi v. United States, 160 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1998) (Fourth Circuit held officer may pat down occupants when officer reasonably suspects drugs in vehicle and other facts do not allay safety concerns)
Rooks v. United States, 596 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2010) (reaffirming that suspicion of drugs in a vehicle can justify ordering occupants out and pat‑downs under certain circumstances)
Dashiell v. State, 374 Md. 85 (Md. 2003) (officers executing warrants with particularized information about weapons and drug trafficking may frisk for safety)
Sellman v. State, 449 Md. 526 (Md. 2016) (officer may not frisk solely because a driver consented to a vehicle search; frisk must be supported by reasonable articulable suspicion)