Norman Gaudette v. Terry M. Davis
160 A.3d 1190
| Me. | 2017Background
- Gaudette sued Davis alleging defamatory and related statements about a past sexual-abuse investigation and a public official; Davis moved to dismiss under Maine’s anti‑SLAPP statute, 14 M.R.S. § 556.
- Davis filed a special motion to dismiss with affidavits; Gaudette opposed with affidavits; the Superior Court (York County) denied the motion after a nontestimonial hearing; Davis appealed.
- Section 556 creates an expedited special motion to dismiss when claims arise from petitioning activity and stays discovery; it requires dismissal unless the plaintiff shows the petitioning was devoid of reasonable factual support or arguable legal basis and caused actual injury.
- Prior Maine precedent shifted standards: Morse Brothers applied a summary‑judgment‑like (defendant‑favorable) approach; Nader I adopted a prima facie (plaintiff‑level) showing; this Court recognized both approaches had problems protecting competing constitutional interests.
- The Court (Gorman, J.) holds that courts must first decide as a matter of law whether the challenged conduct is petitioning activity; if so, the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing via pleadings/affidavits.
- If the plaintiff meets the prima facie threshold, the court may (on motion) allow narrowly tailored limited discovery and must hold a limited evidentiary hearing; at that hearing the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the two statutory elements (no reasonable factual/legal support and actual injury) for the petitioning acts he seeks to pursue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Davis’s statements constitute "petitioning activity" under §556 | Gaudette argued statements were actionable and not protected | Davis argued statements fit §556’s broad definition of petitioning | Court: statements were petitioning activity as a matter of law; anti‑SLAPP applies |
| Who bears initial burden to show §556 applies | Gaudette: court should not broadly apply §556 to bar access to courts | Davis: defendant must show claims arise from petitioning | Court: defendant must first establish as a matter of law that claims arise from petitioning activity |
| Standard for plaintiff to defeat anti‑SLAPP motion at the motion stage | Gaudette relied on prima facie standard from Nader I (some evidence) | Davis urged dismissal under a stronger (Morse Brothers) standard | Court: plaintiff must make a prima facie showing via pleadings/affidavits to shift process to next step |
| What happens if plaintiff meets prima facie showing | Gaudette: prima facie should allow suit to proceed without further factfinding | Davis: meet‑and‑end should not require full trial; defend rights to limited process | Court: not automatic denial—allows limited discovery and a focused evidentiary hearing where plaintiff must prove elements by a preponderance; if not proven, dismiss those claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Morse Bros., Inc. v. Webster, 772 A.2d 842 (Me. 2001) (adopted a summary‑judgment‑like standard favoring defendant when affidavits conflict)
- Maietta Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, 847 A.2d 1169 (Me. 2004) (applied Morse Brothers procedure)
- Nader v. Maine Democratic Party (Nader I), 41 A.3d 551 (Me. 2012) (adopted prima facie standard for plaintiff opposing anti‑SLAPP motion)
- Nader v. Maine Democratic Party (Nader II), 66 A.3d 571 (Me. 2013) (clarified de novo review and aspects of burden shifting)
- Camden Nat’l Bank v. Weintraub, 143 A.3d 788 (Me. 2016) (discussed burden allocation under §556)
- Town of Madawaska v. Cayer, 103 A.3d 547 (Me. 2014) (addressed scope and breadth of Maine’s anti‑SLAPP statute)