Noreen Susinno v. Work Out World Inc
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12253
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- On July 28, 2015, Noreen Susinno received an unsolicited prerecorded promotional voicemail on her cell phone from Work Out World (WOW); she did not answer the call.
- Susinno sued in the District of New Jersey under the TCPA, alleging violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (prohibition on prerecorded calls to cellular numbers).
- WOW moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing (inter alia) that a single prerecorded call for which the recipient was not charged falls outside the TCPA and that Susinno lacked Article III standing.
- The District Court dismissed, finding a single solicitation was not the kind of harm Congress sought to prevent and that Susinno suffered no concrete injury; Susinno appealed.
- The Third Circuit reviewed statutory interpretation and standing de novo and framed the appeal as two questions: (1) whether the TCPA covers the alleged call and (2) whether Susinno’s alleged harm is a concrete injury for Article III purposes.
- The Third Circuit held the TCPA does provide a cause of action for the alleged call and that Susinno alleged a concrete (intangible) injury—vacating the dismissal and remanding for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Statutory scope: Does §227(b)(1)(A)(iii) prohibit a single prerecorded call to a cell phone not charged to the recipient? | The TCPA forbids prerecorded calls to any cellular telephone service, regardless of whether the called party is charged. | The statutory wording limits coverage to cell services for which the called party is charged; Congress focused on cost of calls. | The court rejected WOW’s narrowing: the provision’s structure and §227(b)(2)(C) (which contemplates FCC exemption for calls not charged to the recipient) show Congress intended to cover uncharged cell calls. |
| Article III standing: Does receipt of a single unsolicited prerecorded voicemail constitute a concrete injury? | Susinno argued the call invaded privacy/nuisance—the very harms Congress sought to prevent—so it is a concrete intangible injury under Spokeo. | WOW (and amici) contended the alleged harm is too trivial/technical to establish concrete injury; Spokeo requires more than statutory violation. | The court held the alleged invasion of privacy/nuisance is the injury Congress targeted and is closely related to traditional intrusion-upon-seclusion harms; under Spokeo and Horizon, this suffices as a concrete injury. |
Key Cases Cited
- McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Tr., 458 F.3d 281 (3d Cir.) (standard of review for jurisdictional dismissal)
- United States v. Zavrel, 384 F.3d 130 (3d Cir.) (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading standard for plausible claims)
- Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir.) (interpretive discussion of §227(b)(1) language)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Article III requires a concrete injury; intangible harms can be concrete)
- In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir.) (applying Spokeo; statutory violations that target harms Congress sought to prevent can satisfy concreteness)
- Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir.) (unwanted texts/calls can constitute concrete TCPA injuries)
- Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) (favoring clear rules for jurisdictional questions)
