Noelle Hanrahan v. Gary Mohr
905 F.3d 947
| 6th Cir. | 2018Background
- Plaintiffs: five prisoners involved in the 1993 Lucasville riot (four restricted-population/death-row inmates and one general-population death-row inmate, Skatzes) and four journalists denied in-person, recorded interviews with those prisoners.
- ODRC policy categorically prohibited face-to-face or video-recorded media interviews with restricted-population inmates; general-population interview approvals considered factors including "nature of the interview" and victim impact.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming First and Fourteenth Amendment violations (content-based restriction and due process/equal protection theories; latter claims not pursued on appeal).
- District court granted summary judgment for defendants as to restricted-population prisoners (alternative communication channels existed) but denied as to Skatzes; later ODRC revised media policies and approved Skatzes’s interviews and defendants moved to dismiss as moot.
- Sixth Circuit affirmed: (1) the categorical restriction on restricted-population inmates survived Turner scrutiny and (2) the remaining claims were moot after ODRC’s policy changes and granting of interviews.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether ODRC’s categorical ban on in-person interviews for restricted-population inmates violated the First Amendment | The ban was content-based (motivated by anticipated discussion of Lucasville) and therefore unlawful | The policy is a neutral, security-based regulation reasonably related to legitimate penological interests | Held constitutional under Turner: valid, rational connection to prison security; not invalid merely for targeting certain speech when serving security interests |
| 2) Whether a content-based ban is per se invalid in prison context | Content-based restrictions are presumptively suspect and must be struck down | Turner/Thornburgh allow content-informed rules if they further important governmental interest unrelated to suppression of expression | Court: Turner/Thornburgh permit some content-based distinctions so long as the governmental objective is legitimate, neutral in purpose, and rationally related to that objective |
| 3) Application of Turner factors (alternatives, impact, absence of ready alternatives) | In-person interviews are essential to journalism and have no adequate substitutes | Restricted inmates retain alternative channels (letters, phone); in-person interviews pose security risks and no less-restrictive alternatives adequately protect security | Court: alternative channels adequate; impact and lack of viable alternatives favor the restriction, so Turner factors overall support constitutionality |
| 4) Mootness after ODRC policy revisions and granting of Skatzes interviews | Policy changes are recent, easily reversible, and leave officials with unfettered discretion, so case remains live | Government voluntary cessation and policy reform are genuine; interviews granted, so no live controversy remains | Held moot: government self-correction deemed genuine and approval of interviews eliminated any meaningful prospective relief; declaratory/injunctive claims dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (establishes four-factor test for prison regulations affecting constitutional rights)
- Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (clarifies Turner neutrality requirement: government objective must be legitimate and unrelated to suppression of expression)
- Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (prison speech restrictions must further a substantial governmental interest unrelated to suppressing expression)
- Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (upheld categorical limits on face-to-face media interviews where prison security justified the rule)
- Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974) (recognizes that press attention can create inmate notoriety that threatens institutional order)
- Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (voluntary cessation doctrine and mootness principles)
