Noel Plank v. State of Florida
190 So. 3d 594
| Fla. | 2016Background
- Noel Plank, a prospective juror, was perceived as intoxicated during voir dire; a breathalyzer administered off the record showed a BAC of 0.111. The judge convened a contempt hearing and, after limited on-the-record inquiry, found Plank guilty of direct criminal contempt and sentenced him to 30 days (later mitigated to time served).
- Plank appealed arguing he was entitled to appointed counsel or an opportunity to obtain counsel before incarceration for contempt.
- The First District affirmed and certified conflict with Second and Fourth District decisions that required counsel in direct contempt when incarceration is imposed.
- The Florida Supreme Court accepted review to resolve the inter-district conflict about the right to counsel in direct criminal contempt proceedings.
- The Court held: (1) a trial court need not appoint counsel or delay to allow counsel in direct criminal contempt proceedings where incarceration does not exceed six months; (2) however, Plank’s case involved indirect (not direct) contempt because the judge relied on evidence not personally observed, so Plank was entitled to the procedures (including counsel) under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.840.
Issues
| Issue | Plank's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel must be appointed before incarcerating an individual for direct criminal contempt | Sixth Amendment, Fla. Const., Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111 and §27.51 require counsel or opportunity to obtain counsel | Direct contempt is a narrow exception; courts may summarily punish misconduct observed in their presence without appointment of counsel; rule 3.830 governs | No mandatory right to counsel in direct contempt when incarceration ≤ 6 months; court may but is not required to appoint counsel |
| Whether Bloom requires appointment of counsel in all direct contempt cases where incarceration is possible | Bloom compels full Sixth Amendment protections including counsel irrespective of six-month line | Bloom guarantees jury trial right when sentence >6 months but does not mandate counsel for lesser sentences | Bloom only triggers Sixth Amendment jury trial right (and related protections) when imprisonment exceeds six months; it does not require counsel for shorter terms |
| Whether Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111 (appointment for offenses punishable by incarceration) overrides direct contempt rule 3.830 | Rule 3.111 mandates counsel for prosecutions punishable by incarceration, including contempt | Specific contempt rule 3.830 permits summary punishment and governs direct contempt; specific trumps general | Rule 3.830 (direct contempt) controls; rule 3.111 does not automatically require counsel for direct contempt punishable by ≤ 6 months |
| Whether Plank’s conviction was properly treated as direct contempt | Plank argued many relied-on facts were not personally observed by the judge, making it indirect contempt entitled to rule 3.840 protections | State maintained the conduct occurred in court and was subject to summary punishment | Court held the judge relied on off‑the‑record testimony/evidence (breath test, juror reports) so the contempt was indirect; Plank entitled to rule 3.840 protections (including counsel) and conviction vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888) (recognizes inherent power to summarily punish direct contempt observed by the court)
- In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (due process protections may be relaxed for direct contempt that is personally observed by the judge)
- Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (Sixth Amendment jury-trial right applies when contempt sentence exceeds six months)
- Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (actual imprisonment for any offense triggers right to counsel absent knowing waiver)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel is fundamental and applicable to states)
- Parisi v. Broward Cty., 769 So.2d 359 (Fla. 2000) (discusses contempt powers and due process protections, including right to counsel)
- Baldwin, 770 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1985) (summarily holding an individual in direct criminal contempt vindicates court authority)