Noel N. Chua, M.D. v. Andrew J. Ekonomou
1f4th948
| 11th Cir. | 2021Background
- Noel Chua, a Georgia physician, was criminally prosecuted for a patient’s death; the DA also commenced a civil forfeiture and a state judge appointed Michael Lambros as receiver, who (with counsel Andrew Ekonomou) depleted Chua’s seized assets.
- Chua was convicted (felony murder and controlled-substances counts), later accepted a plea agreement that resulted in new convictions and his release in 2017.
- After release, Chua sued Lambros, Ekonomou, their firms, and Steve Berry under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, federal and Georgia RICO statutes, and related claims, alleging a conspiracy to deprive him of civil rights and assets.
- The district court dismissed claims arising from acts within the receivership for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Barton v. Barbour (Chua had not obtained leave from the appointing state court) and dismissed remaining claims for failure to state a claim; limited leave to amend was given but not utilized.
- On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held the Barton doctrine did not bar federal jurisdiction over claims concerning acts taken within the receivership because the receivership had ended and the res was no longer controlled by the appointing court, but it affirmed dismissal on other grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Barton doctrine deprived federal court of subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against receiver and counsel for acts taken during receivership | Barton requires leave to sue receivers; district court lacked jurisdiction because Chua did not obtain leave | Barton inapplicable once receivership ended and res no longer under state-court control | Barton did not apply here because the receivership had ended and there was no exclusive in rem jurisdiction remaining; district court had jurisdiction |
| Whether receiver and his counsel are immune for acts taken in scope of receivership | Chua claims misconduct during receivership; seeks damages | Receivers (and counsel for receivers) receive judicial immunity for acts within the scope of their authority | Judicial immunity bars Chua’s claims arising from acts within the receivership; those claims must be dismissed with prejudice |
| Whether Chua pleaded a viable § 1985 claim (racial or class-based animus requirement) | The conspiracy sought to exclude black jurors; that demonstrates racial animus supporting § 1985 | Chua’s alleged motive was to secure conviction—not to deprive him of equal protection based on race or class; strikes don’t show conspiratorial animus against Chua as a class | Dismissal affirmed: complaint did not allege the conspiracy was motivated by racial or other class-based invidious animus required by § 1985 |
| Whether RICO and other statutory claims were sufficiently pled and whether amendment should be allowed | Alleged statutory violations and conspiracy support RICO predicate acts; requests leave to amend | Plaintiff failed to allege predicate criminal acts or a pattern of racketeering; district court did not abuse discretion denying further amendment | RICO/state-RICO and related claims fail for lack of predicate acts; leave to amend denied as unjustified (no two bites rule) |
Key Cases Cited
- Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126 (1881) (court must grant leave before suit against a receiver in possession of res)
- Carter v. Rodgers, 220 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2000) (applied Barton principle to bankruptcy trustees as federal common law)
- Tufts v. Hay, 977 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2020) (Barton inapplicable where bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction; no conceivable effect on estate)
- Prop. Mgmt. & Invs., Inc. v. Lewis, 752 F.2d 599 (11th Cir. 1985) (receivers entitled to judicial immunity for acts within scope)
- Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000) (judicial immunity applies even if acts were erroneous, malicious, or beyond jurisdiction)
- Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (§ 1985 requires racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus)
- Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2002) (qualified immunity standard for individual-capacity suits)
- Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (qualified immunity applies to certain § 1985(3) claims)