217 So. 3d 196
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2017Background
- Injunction for protection against domestic violence entered Feb 22, 2000, after incident during the parties' marriage while appellee was pregnant.
- Parties later divorced; child born; initially complied, but appellee later had voluntary contact and resumed living with appellant due to complications from a subsequent pregnancy and need to care for a medically fragile twin.
- Appellee eventually left after an incident where appellant disconnected the baby’s heart monitor, leading to emergency hospitalization; she testified to controlling behavior, threats, false reports, withholding support, and at least one alleged battery.
- Appellant was incarcerated beginning in 2010; parental rights were terminated in 2004–2005; he has had no physical contact since incarceration but his sentences will expire in under five years.
- Appellant moved to dissolve the long-standing injunction, arguing incarceration and years of non-contact justified dissolution; appellee testified she reasonably fears future domestic violence if appellant is released.
- Trial court denied the motion, finding appellee’s fear reasonable and that the injunction still served a valid purpose; appellant appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Noe's Argument | Appellee's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether incarceration and long non-contact require dissolution of a longstanding domestic-violence injunction | Incarceration and years of no contact changed circumstances so injunction serves no purpose | Past violations and credible ongoing fear of future violence upon release justify keeping injunction | Denial affirmed: incarceration alone insufficient; trial court did not abuse discretion |
| Proper legal standard for dissolution | Trial court applied wrong standard (claimed) | Trial court applied correct standard: movant must show underlying scenario no longer exists; respondent must show reasonable fear | Court held standard applied correctly |
| Weight of prior violations and voluntary contact | Voluntary contact and long passage of time undermine need for injunction | Prior violations and coercive conduct support continued protection | Trial court reasonably relied on live testimony of repeated violations and fear |
| Whether absence of violations over time (or distant release date) mandates dissolution | Long compliance/no violations and distant release support dissolution | Each case depends on record; history of violations can rebut argument for dissolution | Court distinguished cases of no violations/long incarcerations and affirmed denial here |
Key Cases Cited
- Alkhoury v. Alkhoury, 54 So.3d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (movant must show underlying scenario no longer exists; respondent must show reasonable fear)
- Bush v. Henney, 175 So.3d 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (dissolution upheld where no violations over long period)
- Simonik v. Patterson, 752 So.2d 692 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (trial court has broad discretion in injunction matters)
- Shierling v. Hall, 67 So.3d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (denial of modification not an abuse of discretion where record lacks support)
- Carricarte v. Carricarte, 961 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (trial court’s credibility-based findings entitled to deference)
- Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980) (defines appellate review of judicial discretion; reasonableness test)
- Spaulding v. Shane, 150 So.3d 852 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (dissolution where long incarceration and uniform compliance)
- Baker v. Baker, 112 So.3d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (similar to Spaulding; lengthy incarceration and no violations supported dissolution)