Nobles, J. v. Staples, Inc.
150 A.3d 110
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff John Nobles, a Philadelphia police corporal, fell when his office chair collapsed in April 2011 and sued Staples for product defect causing personal injuries.
- The chair was purchased circa 2008 but had no purchase records, specifications, or the physical chair available at trial (it was discarded after the incident); plaintiff photographed the broken chair minutes after the fall.
- Nobles retained engineering expert Keith Bergman, who reviewed documents and the post-failure photograph and concluded the chair failed the BIFMA X5.1-2002 standard, but he did not inspect the chair, test exemplars, or cite empirical support tying the chair to the standard at manufacture.
- Staples filed pretrial motions in limine to exclude testimony that the chair was purchased from Staples and to bar Bergman’s liability testimony; the trial court granted both motions just after jury selection.
- After exclusion of Bergman’s testimony, Staples moved to dismiss (recorded as a nonsuit); Nobles’ counsel did not meaningfully oppose and acknowledged that exclusion of expert proof left the malfunction theory unsupported.
- The trial court treated the dismissal as summary judgment; the Superior Court affirmed, finding exclusion of Bergman proper and summary judgment appropriate because Nobles could not prove malfunction/cause without admissible expert proof.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusion of expert testimony (Rule 702) | Bergman could reliably opine from photograph and BIFMA standards that the chair malfunctioned | Bergman lacked factual foundation, did not inspect chair, cite empirical authority, or rule out other causes | Court held exclusion proper: report was speculative, lacked scientific authority, and amounted to res ipsa dressed as expert opinion |
| Day-of-trial dismissal/nonsuit vs. summary judgment | It was procedurally improper to grant nonsuit/summary judgment on eve of trial without plaintiff presenting evidence | Court may treat a dismissal after jury empanelment but before evidence as summary judgment when no prejudice and issues were litigated | Court upheld treatment as summary judgment and found no procedural error given notice and opportunity to respond |
| Coordinate-jurisdiction rule (one judge reversing another) | Prior judges denied Staples’ earlier summary judgment motions; granting now violates coordinate-jurisdiction rule | Later ruling was based on materially changed record (preclusion of expert) so reconsideration is permitted | Court held no violation because new rulings (preclusion) changed the record and justified renewed disposition |
| Sufficiency under malfunction theory of liability | Plaintiff’s fact witnesses could eliminate misuse and secondary causes, so case should proceed without expert | Malfunction theory requires proof of malfunction; without admissible expert opinion plaintiff cannot prove malfunction element | Court held plaintiff could not meet the malfunction requirement without expert proof; summary judgment was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Commonwealth v. Walker, 92 A.3d 766 (Pa. 2014) (standard for abuse of discretion review)
- Snizavich v. Rohm & Haas Co., 83 A.3d 191 (Pa. Super. 2013) (expert opinion must cite scientific authority or facts applied to case-specific facts)
- Beard v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 41 A.3d 823 (Pa. 2012) (malfunction theory requires proof of malfunction plus elimination of secondary causes)
- DiGregorio v. Keystone Health Plan E., 840 A.2d 361 (Pa. Super. 2003) (nonsuit entered before plaintiff evidence may be treated as summary judgment or judgment on pleadings)
- Rivera v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 832 A.2d 487 (Pa. Super. 2003) (pretrial exclusion of key evidence can make trial futile and justify early disposition)
- Wiggins v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 29 A.3d 9 (Pa. Super. 2011) (manufacturing defect sometimes proven by circumstantial evidence without expert testimony)
- Duquesne Light Co. v. Woodland Hills Sch. Dist., 700 A.2d 1038 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (circumstantial expert causation upheld where expert studied available evidence)
- Phillips v. Lock, 86 A.3d 906 (Pa. Super. 2014) (day-of-trial grant of summary judgment is permissible if non-moving party had notice and opportunity to respond)