Noah v. Assor, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1284

Background

Tenant Marlen Noah rented from landlord Isaac Assor (Mar–2017) and alleges pervasive sexual harassment during tenancy (propositions, stalking, trespasses, threats re: lease renewal and security deposit).
Noah sued under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b)–(c), 3617 alleged) and Florida Fair Housing Act (Fla. Stat. §§ 760.23(2)–(3), 760.37), plus common‑law intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
Defendant moved to dismiss all five counts for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff conceded two FHA citations were mistaken and sought leave to amend.
The Court evaluated plausibility under Twombly/Iqbal, HUD regulations on sexual harassment (quid pro quo and hostile environment), and analogous federal/state authorities.
Rulings: §3617 interference (quid pro quo and hostile environment theories) and Fla. §760.23(3) and §760.37 survived; FHA §3604(f) disability claims dismissed (pleading error) with leave to amend to correct to §§3604(b)–(c); Fla. §760.23(2) (terms/conditions) dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead ‘‘ready, willing and able’’ to renew; IIED dismissed with prejudice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §3617 liability lies for landlord sexual harassment (quid pro quo/hostile environment)	Noah alleges quid pro quo threats (lease renewal, deposit) and pervasive hostile conduct — so §3617 interference applies	Assor argued Twombly implausibility and challenged elements (including readiness to renew) and contended force/threat required	Denied dismissal: Court finds allegations plausibly state §3617 interference (quid pro quo and hostile environment); no force required under §3617 as a matter of civil liability
Whether Plaintiff may plead FHA §§3604(f)(1)–(2) (disability)	Plaintiff conceded citation error and sought leave to amend to §§3604(b)–(c) (sex discrimination)	Defendant moved to dismiss the disability claims on merits	Granted dismissal of §§3604(f) claims; leave to amend to assert §§3604(b)–(c) granted
Whether Fla. §760.23(3) (statements/advertisements re rental) applies to alleged oral/conditional statements post‑lease	Noah alleges oral statements conditioning lease renewal on sexual submission and related texts/emails	Assor argued statements were not "with respect to the rental" or occurred post‑rental so inapplicable	Denied dismissal: oral statements are actionable; statements plausibly related to decision to renew; §760.23(3) claim sufficiently pleaded
Whether Fla. §760.23(2) (terms/conditions of rental) pleaded adequately	Noah alleges terms/conditions discrimination by conditioning renewal on sexual conduct	Assor: Noah failed to allege she was "ready, willing and able" to renew (an element)	Granted dismissal without prejudice: plaintiff failed to plead readiness/willingness to renew; leave to amend granted
Whether IIED claim survives	Noah contends harassment produced severe emotional distress	Assor: conduct does not meet Florida's extremely high ‘‘outrageous’’ standard	Granted dismissal with prejudice: allegations, even if offensive and persistent, fall short of the rare extreme needed for IIED under Florida law

Key Cases Cited

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (plausibility standard for complaints)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading must be more than speculative)
United States v. Hurt, 676 F.3d 649 (recognizing sexual harassment actionable under FHA)
Quigley v. Winter, 598 F.3d 938 (FHA hostile environment/harassment context)
Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487 (sexual harassment as FHA discrimination)
Llampallas v. Mini‑Circuits Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236 (harassment infers discriminatory animus)
Revock v. Cowpet Bay W. Condo. Ass'n, 853 F.3d 96 (elements and scope of §3617 interference)
Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (§3617 reaches post‑acquisition conduct)
Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114 (§3617 does not require force or threat of force)
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277 (Florida standard for IIED — ‘‘outrageous’’ conduct)