Niz-Chavez v. Garland
593 U.S. 155
| SCOTUS | 2021Background
- Agusto Niz‑Chavez (Guatemalan national) was placed in removal proceedings in 2013 after unlawfully entering the U.S. in 2005.
- The Government served two separate written communications: an initial document charging him (no time/place), then a later document giving the hearing’s time and place (he appeared with counsel at the scheduled hearing).
- The immigration judge ordered removal; Niz‑Chavez later argued the two‑document service did not trigger the IIRIRA “stop‑time” rule for continuous‑presence credit under 8 U.S.C. §1229b(d)(1).
- The legal question presented: whether a “notice to appear” that triggers the stop‑time rule must be a single document containing all §1229(a)(1) information, or may be supplied in multiple installments.
- Circuits were divided; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split and reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding a single, statutorily compliant document is required to trigger the stop‑time rule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the IIRIRA stop‑time rule is triggered only by a single document containing all information required by 8 U.S.C. §1229(a)(1), or can be triggered by multiple documents that together supply that information | Niz‑Chavez: “a notice to appear” means one discrete written instrument; multiple installments do not constitute the notice that stops the §1229b(d)(1) clock | Government (Garland): the statute defines a notice as “written notice,” which can be provided in one or more installments; stop‑time triggers when all required information has been delivered | Supreme Court: a notice to appear sufficient to trigger the stop‑time rule is a single document containing all §1229(a)(1) information; multiple documents that must be assembled do not suffice |
Key Cases Cited
- Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. _ (2018) (notice lacking hearing time/place does not trigger IIRIRA stop‑time rule)
- Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004) (courts apply statute text when resolving ambiguities rather than deferring to agency interpretations)
- United States Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439 (1993) (scrivener’s‑error doctrine applies only in exceptional drafting‑error circumstances)
- McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931) (ordinary meaning controls statutory interpretation; avoid hyperliteral readings)