Niya Kenny v. Alan Wilson, 885 F.3d 280

Plaintiffs: four individuals (including minor students D.S. and S.P., and college student Nesmith) and Girls Rock Charleston, a nonprofit; several named plaintiffs had prior arrests/charges under S.C. Code § 16-17-420 (Disturbing Schools) or § 16-17-530 (Disorderly Conduct).
Statutes challenged as unconstitutionally vague: Disturbing Schools Law (broad prohibitions on "disturb[ing]" or "acting in an obnoxious manner" at schools) and Disorderly Conduct Law (criminalizing "disorderly or boisterous" conduct and certain profane language near schools).
Plaintiffs alleged the statutes (1) fail to give fair notice and (2) encourage arbitrary/discriminatory enforcement, chilling students’ speech and pushing students into the criminal justice system; cited racial and disability-based disparities in enforcement.
Procedural posture: District court dismissed for lack of standing, finding plaintiffs’ fear of future arrest speculative; plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
Fourth Circuit (Diaz, J.) reviewed de novo, accepted complaint facts as true for standing, and focused on whether plaintiffs alleged an injury in fact sufficient for prospective/declaratory relief (ongoing or certainly impending injury).
Decision: Court vacated dismissal and remanded, holding that at least three plaintiffs (D.S., S.P., and Nesmith) plausibly alleged both a credible threat of prosecution and self-censorship sufficient to establish injury in fact for prospective relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing—injury in fact for prospective/declaratory relief based on fear of future prosecution under the statutes	Plaintiffs (e.g., D.S., S.P., Nesmith) attend schools where they were previously charged and allege they fear future arrest and that the statutes chill protected expressive conduct	Defendants say fear is speculative, not "certainly impending," invoking Lyons; plaintiffs lack intent to engage in proscribed conduct	Held: Plaintiffs plausibly alleged injury—past enforcement, continued statutory scope, and lack of disavowal make threat credible; self-censorship also sufficient to show ongoing injury
Effect of state-court limiting constructions on threat credibility	Plaintiffs say state decisions do not meaningfully clarify many vague statutory phrases as applied to schoolchildren	Defendants rely on South Carolina cases (In re Amir, City of Landrum v. Sarratt) to argue the statutes have been narrowed and therefore pose no credible threat	Held: State decisions do not eliminate the credible threat—those cases do not resolve vagueness as applied to the statutes’ broad terms in school contexts; Tinker/In re Amir do not foreclose vagueness claim

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (statute void-for-vagueness principle requires adequate notice and limits on arbitrary enforcement)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (Article III injury-in-fact must be concrete and particularized)
Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (future injury may suffice when there is substantial risk/certainty of enforcement; past enforcement supports credibility)
Babbitt v. Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (pre-enforcement challenges where plaintiffs intend conduct arguably affected by statute can establish standing)
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (no need to first risk arrest; pre-enforcement challenge permitted where credible threat exists)
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (vagueness doctrine and risk of arbitrary enforcement)
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (student speech protected unless it materially disrupts school)
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (time, place, manner analysis; contrast with broader criminal statutes)
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (need for likelihood of future harm for injunctive relief; distinguished here)
David v. Alphin, 704 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. standard of review for standing dismissal)
Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226 (self-censorship can satisfy injury-in-fact for First Amendment chill)