Nixon v. Pierce County School District
322 Ga. App. 745
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Nixon, ~39 weeks pregnant, was rear-ended by a Pierce County school bus on March 10, 2008; she suffered bruising and pain and was hospitalized and induced the next day; her daughter Kylee was born March 11.
- Pregnancy had been normal prior to the collision; Kylee showed no signs of neurological issues at birth.
- By 6–12 months Kylee exhibited right-side weakness; a pediatric neurologist diagnosed cerebral palsy caused by a perinatal stroke (defined as occurring before birth up to one month after delivery).
- The neurologist testified that perinatal strokes can be caused by in utero trauma, that Kylee’s stroke likely occurred between ~30 weeks gestation and one month postnatal, and that it was "entirely possible" the bus accident caused the stroke, but could not say more than a 50% likelihood; other possible causes (e.g., small heart defect or spontaneous event) were identified.
- Nixon sued the School District for negligence (personal claim and next-friend for Kylee). The District moved for partial summary judgment on causation; the trial court granted the motion. Nixon appealed.
- The appellate court reviewed de novo and reversed, holding that although expert testimony was required on this medical causation question, the neurologist’s opinion combined with non‑expert evidence created a genuine issue for the jury.
Issues
| Issue | Nixon's Argument | District's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether expert testimony is required to prove causation between maternal motor-vehicle accident and infant perinatal stroke | Causation in a simple negligence action need not require expert evidence | The connection is a specialized medical question beyond common knowledge and requires expert proof | Court: Expert testimony is required because causation involves medical questions not within common knowledge |
| Whether the neurologist’s testimony (50% likelihood/possibility) is sufficient to survive summary judgment | Nixon: The neurologist’s opinion, when combined with nonexpert facts (normal pregnancy, timing, serious collision), raises a jury question | District: The expert’s only-possible/50% opinion is too speculative to create a genuine issue of material fact | Court: The expert’s possible causation opinion, when coupled with nonexpert evidence (normal pregnancy, timing, injury severity), is enough to create a jury issue; summary judgment improper |
| Standard for expert causation at summary judgment | N/A (argues combination of evidence meets standard) | Expert must show causation to a reasonable probability to admit/jury | Court: Expert generally must show reasonable probability, but an expert’s weaker opinion can be supplemented by nonexpert evidence to create a jury question |
| Whether evidence was "plain, palpable and undisputable" such that summary judgment was appropriate | N/A | Trial court treated evidence as insufficient for jury | Court: Evidence was not plain and undisputable; jury question exists, so reversal of summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622 (Ga. 2010) (distinguishes when expert medical proof is required for causation)
- Self v. Exec. Comm. of the Ga. Baptist Convention, Inc., 245 Ga. 548 (Ga. 1979) (jury may decide causation in some nontechnical injury contexts without expert testimony)
- Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 290 Ga. App. 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (expert testimony is required where medical questions of causation exist)
- Knight v. Roberts, 316 Ga. App. 599 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (summary judgment standard and requirement to create jury issue)
- Natl Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Durham, 115 Ga. App. 420 (Ga. Ct. App. 1967) (weak expert opinion plus pre- and post-exposure facts can support causation for jury)
- Rodrigues v. Ga. Pacific Corp., 290 Ga. App. 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing summary judgment where expert offered possible causation and nonexpert evidence supported timing and exposure)
- Hodson v. Mawson, 227 Ga. App. 490 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (medical testimony of possibility may be sufficient when corroborated by other evidence)