Niveen Ismail v. County of Orange
693 F. App'x 507
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Niveen Ismail appealed the dismissal and summary judgment of § 1983 and § 1985 claims arising from California juvenile-court dependency proceedings that terminated her parental rights to her son A.I. in 2008.
- She alleged Orange County social workers submitted false reports and testimony (fraud on the juvenile court) and that adoptive parents Michael and Shelby Ford conspired with them; she sought damages and reinstatement of parental rights.
- One separate claim accused social worker Julie Fulkerson of violating Ismail’s privacy by disclosing a court-ordered psychological evaluation to a detective investigating an alleged kidnapping attempt.
- The district court dismissed with prejudice the fraud-based and related claims against the social workers (except the Fulkerson privacy claim) under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine; Orange County was dismissed as derivative; the Fords were dismissed as nonstate actors.
- The district court later granted summary judgment for Fulkerson on qualified immunity grounds. Ismail appealed; the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal court jurisdiction is barred by Rooker–Feldman for claims attacking juvenile-court rulings and seeking reversal | Ismail argued her claims are § 1983/§ 1985 claims alleging social-worker fraud and constitutional violations, not a de facto appeal | Defendants argued the suit seeks relief from state-court judgments and is thus a de facto appeal barred by Rooker–Feldman | Held: Rooker–Feldman bars the fraud-based claims because they are inextricably intertwined with state-court rulings and seek relief from those judgments (affirmed) |
| Whether allegations of extrinsic fraud avoid Rooker–Feldman | Ismail argued extrinsic fraud claims can proceed in federal court | Defendants argued fraud was litigated and rejected in state court (not extrinsic) | Held: Extrinsic-fraud exception inapplicable because Ismail does not allege she was prevented from litigating fraud in state court; claims were already litigated and rejected |
| Whether Ismail had standing to bring a facial challenge to California’s parental-rights statute | Ismail characterized her statutory challenge as facial and typically cognizable in federal court | Defendants argued lack of standing because Ismail has no concrete, imminent threat of future harm under the statute | Held: Dismissed for lack of standing—no imminent or particularized threat shown |
| Whether Fulkerson is liable for privacy violation in disclosing psych evaluation and whether qualified immunity applies | Ismail argued disclosure violated her constitutional privacy rights | Fulkerson argued she responded to a detective’s formal request supported by a state-court order and advice of County Counsel | Held: Qualified immunity applies; a reasonable social worker would not have known disclosure under those circumstances violated clearly established rights |
| Whether the Fords are state actors subject to § 1983 liability | Ismail contended the Fords conspired with social workers and should be treated as state actors | Fords argued they are private adoptive parents and not state actors | Held: The Fords are not state actors; dismissal proper (no state-action alleged or briefed) |
| Whether pro se plaintiff should have been granted leave to amend | Ismail requested leave to amend fraud claims | Defendants argued amendment would be futile due to Rooker–Feldman, collateral estoppel, statutes of limitation, and Heck | Held: Majority denied leave as futile because fraud issues were litigated in state court; dissent would have allowed amendment because futility wasn’t "absolutely clear" |
Key Cases Cited
- Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (establishing that lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review state-court judgments)
- D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (holding federal district courts cannot review final state-court decisions and articulating Rooker–Feldman scope)
- Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir.) (explaining when a federal suit is a de facto appeal under Rooker–Feldman)
- Reusser v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 525 F.3d 855 (9th Cir.) (discussing extrinsic fraud exception to Rooker–Feldman)
- Canatella v. California, 304 F.3d 843 (9th Cir.) (standing requirements for prospective or declaratory relief challenging state statutes)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (qualified immunity standard for government officials)
- Lucido v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.3d 335 (Cal.) (requirements for collateral estoppel under California law)
