Nino Franklin v. Randy Keyes, 30 F.4th 634

Background

Franklin was convicted in 2014 in the District of Minnesota for being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced under the ACCA after the court counted six prior convictions (three Minnesota burglaries, two Illinois residential burglaries, and one Illinois kidnapping/armed-robbery conviction).
He did not appeal or file a timely § 2255 motion within the one-year limitation period set by § 2255(f)(1).
After Mathis v. United States clarified the divisibility/modified-categorical approach, Franklin filed a § 2241 habeas petition in the district of his confinement (Central District of Illinois) arguing his ACCA enhancement was erroneous; the district court denied relief because, it held, three qualifying predicates remained.
Subsequent circuit developments (including this court’s Glispie decision) established that Illinois residential burglary does not categorically qualify as an ACCA predicate, eliminating two more predicates and leaving Franklin with only one qualifying prior offense.
The government conceded Franklin’s ACCA sentence was unlawful but argued he could not pass through the § 2255(e) saving-clause gateway (as interpreted in In re Davenport) because his claim relied on Glispie and because he could have pursued a § 2255 motion earlier; the Seventh Circuit rejected that defense and remanded with instructions to grant habeas relief.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Franklin may seek § 2241 relief through the § 2255(e) saving clause (Davenport gateway).	Franklin: Mathis created the controlling statutory-interpretation change and, because of circuit precedent and the § 2255 time bar, § 2255 never gave him a fair opportunity to litigate the claim.	Government: Franklin could have (and should have) raised the issue on direct appeal or in a timely § 2255 motion; his entitlement depends on Glispie (a circuit decision), not Mathis.	The court held Franklin satisfied Davenport: his claim rests fundamentally on Mathis and § 2255 was inadequate because he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain relief.
Whether the saving-clause trigger must come from the Supreme Court rather than a circuit decision.	Franklin: The operative defect here is Mathis (a Supreme Court statutory decision) that corrected circuit law; subsequent circuit rulings affected the ultimate predicate count.	Government: Relies on the fact that Glispie (a circuit decision) was necessary to eliminate remaining predicates and that Davenport centered on § 2255(h) issues, not this mix.	The court did not adopt a bright-line rule but held Mathis was the fundamental trigger here and that Franklin met Davenport’s requirements.
Whether § 2255(f)’s one-year limitations bar (as opposed to § 2255(h)’s successive-motion bar) can render § 2255 inadequate or ineffective under Davenport.	Franklin: The time bar, combined with pre‑Mathis circuit precedent, made § 2255 effectively unavailable; forcing him to file a futile timely motion would be pointless.	Government: Davenport addressed § 2255(h); the court should not extend Davenport to cases blocked solely by § 2255(f).	The court held § 2255(f) can make § 2255 inadequate in the same way as § 2255(h) when a petitioner, through no fault of his own, had no realistic opportunity to correct a fundamental defect.
Whether the error is a miscarriage of justice warranting relief.	Franklin: The ACCA enhancement was legally invalid once Mathis and Glispie are applied.	Government: Conceded the sentence is unlawful.	The court accepted the concession and found the error grave enough to constitute a miscarriage of justice.

Key Cases Cited

In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir.) (establishes saving-clause gateway analysis)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (Supreme Court) (clarified divisibility and limits on the modified categorical approach)
Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d 851 (7th Cir.) (applies Davenport to Mathis-based claims)
Guenther v. Marske, 997 F.3d 735 (7th Cir.) (applies Davenport test in Mathis context)
United States v. Glispie, 978 F.3d 502 (7th Cir.) (held Illinois residential burglary is not a categorical ACCA predicate)
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (Supreme Court) (established categorical approach for ACCA predicates)
Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (Supreme Court) (example of statutory rule that triggered Davenport relief)
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (Supreme Court) (held ACCA residual clause unconstitutionally vague)