Niki DaSilva v. State of Indiana, 30 F.4th 671

At the Indiana Legislature’s 2018 "Sine Die" party, Attorney General Curtis T. Hill Jr. verbally and physically harassed several women who worked for the House or Senate.
The Indiana Supreme Court found Hill committed criminal battery and suspended his law license in In re Hill, and Hill left office in 2021.
Four legislative staffers sued Hill and the State of Indiana under Title VII and other laws; the House and Senate intervened, claiming they (not the State) are the plaintiffs’ employers.
The district court dismissed claims against Hill without prejudice and dismissed claims against Indiana, concluding Indiana is not the plaintiffs’ employer; plaintiffs sought a Rule 54(b) certification 39 days after dismissal and appealed the State’s dismissal.
Indiana argued the appeal should be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction because plaintiffs waited longer than the 30-day period from Schaefer/King; the court found those rule-based time limits are forfeitable under Hamer and that Indiana waived the defense by raising it too late, so it reached the merits.
On the merits the Seventh Circuit held the proper Title VII defendants are the employing legislative bodies (House and Senate), not the State of Indiana, because hiring/firing and remedial authority rest with those bodies.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of Rule 54(b) request / appellate jurisdiction	39 days is only slightly beyond 30 and pandemic-related disruption justifies leniency	Schaefer and King impose a 30-day maximum; late request deprives court of jurisdiction	Time limits are case-processing (Hamer); Indiana forfeited/waived the Schaefer/King defense by raising it too late, so appellate jurisdiction exists
Whether State of Indiana is the plaintiffs' "employer" under Title VII	State is an appropriate defendant for Title VII relief tied to misconduct by elected statewide official	House and Senate actually hire, supervise, discipline, and can provide relief; the State (executive branch) lacks that control	The State is not plaintiffs' employer; the House and Senate are the proper Title VII defendants; dismissal of Indiana affirmed

In re Hill, 144 N.E.3d 184 (Ind. 2020) (state supreme court finding of battery and suspension of Hill’s law license)
Hamer v. Neighborhood Housing Services, 138 S. Ct. 13 (2017) (rule-based time limits are case-processing rules and may be forfeited)
Schaefer v. First National Bank of Lincolnwood, 465 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1972) (30-day limit for requesting Rule 54(b) certification articulated)
King v. Newbold, 845 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2017) (applied Schaefer’s 30-day rule)
Hearne v. Chicago Board of Education, 185 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 1999) (agency-specific approach: the entity with hiring/firing authority is the employer for Title VII suits)
Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000) (followed Hearne’s agency-specific employer rule)
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956) (Rule 54(b) judgments subject to abuse-of-discretion review)
Lopez v. Massachusetts, 588 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2009) (agreeing that the employing agency, not the state as a whole, is the proper Title VII defendant)
Gulino v. New York State Education Department, 460 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2006) (same)
Sutherland v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 2003) (same)