987 F.3d 1025
Fed. Cir.2021Background
- Army Corps issued an RFP; NIKA submitted a bid but did not receive the award and timely requested a debriefing.
- The Corps provided a written debriefing on March 4, 2020, and informed NIKA it could submit additional questions within two business days; NIKA submitted no questions.
- NIKA filed a GAO protest on March 10 (six days after the written debriefing); GAO denied an automatic stay as untimely under 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d) (which permits a stay if notice is given within five days of the debriefing date).
- NIKA sued in the Court of Federal Claims, arguing the debriefing includes the two-business-day question window per 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(5)(B)(vii), so the GAO filing was timely; the CFC granted a stay.
- The government appealed; the underlying GAO protest concluded while this appeal was pending, rendering NIKA’s interest moot, so NIKA did not respond.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the case is moot or fits the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception | The controversy fits the exception; review warranted because timelines preclude full review before mootness | The order has expired and the appeal is moot | Exception applies: issue is capable of repetition and evades review; merits considered |
| Whether the "debriefing date" in 31 U.S.C. § 3553(d)(4)(A)(ii) is the date the bidder receives the debriefing or the end of the two-business-day question period | The debriefing includes the two-business-day question window (per 10 U.S.C. § 2305(b)(5)(B)(vii)), so the five-day GAO-filing deadline runs after that window | "Debriefing date" means the date the bidder receives the debriefing; the two-day question opportunity occurs after the debriefing but within the five-day filing window; only when questions are submitted does the deadline extend | Held for the government: "debriefing date" = date of receipt; NIKA’s GAO protest (filed on day six) was untimely and did not invoke the automatic stay |
Key Cases Cited
- DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (mootness doctrine: case becomes non-justiciable when it no longer affects the parties)
- Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (standards for mootness and exceptions)
- Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (recognizing issues that are capable of repetition yet evading review)
- City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (requirements for showing the capable-of-repetition exception)
- Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (emphasizing that capable-of-repetition does not require a showing that recurrence is more probable than not)
