Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715

Russell Bartlett was arrested at a large Alaska festival and charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest after officers Nieves and Weight intervened in a confrontation; charges were later dismissed.
Bartlett sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 claiming the arrest was retaliation for protected speech (refusing to talk to Nieves and intervening with Weight), relying in part on an affidavit that Nieves said after arrest: “bet you wish you would have talked to me now.”
The District Court granted summary judgment for the officers, holding that probable cause defeated the retaliation claim; the Ninth Circuit reversed, allowing the claim to proceed based on alleged retaliatory motive and the chilling-effect test.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the existence of probable cause bars a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim under §1983.
The Court held that, as a general rule, a retaliatory-arrest plaintiff must plead and prove the absence of probable cause; but it carved out a narrow exception allowing claims to proceed when the plaintiff presents objective comparator evidence showing others similarly situated who were not arrested.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether probable cause defeats a §1983 First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim	Bartlett: proof of officers’ retaliatory motive and injury suffices; no categorical probable-cause bar	Officers: presence of probable cause should legally preclude retaliation claims	Generally yes: probable cause normally defeats the claim; plaintiff must plead and prove lack of probable cause
Causation standard for retaliation claims	Bartlett: ask whether officer intended to punish for protected speech (subjective intent)	Officers: require objective showing (no probable cause) to avoid probing subjective intent	But-for causation required; subjective intent alone insufficient—absence of probable cause is the default threshold to show causation
Role of common law and §1983 interpretation	Bartlett: common-law analogies don’t require a probable-cause bar here	Officers: common-law torts (false imprisonment/malicious prosecution) show probable cause defeats arrest-based claims	Common-law analogies support treating probable cause as a general defense, but Court allows a narrow modern qualification
Whether any exception exists when probable cause is present	Bartlett: Mt. Healthy-style framework should apply universally	Officers: no exception—probable cause always fatal	Narrow exception: plaintiff may proceed if objective evidence shows similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same protected speech were not arrested

Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (established requirement to plead and prove absence of probable cause in retaliatory-prosecution cases)
Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (but-for/motivating-factor framework for government-retaliation claims)
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 (discussing causal complexities in retaliatory-arrest cases)
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (officer subjective intent irrelevant to Fourth Amendment probable-cause analysis)
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (court’s reluctance to probe officers’ subjective intent in Fourth Amendment context)
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (requiring strong comparator evidence for selective-prosecution claims; referenced for comparator concept)
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (distinguishing objective Fourth Amendment reasonableness from constitutional claims that hinge on official motive)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (officers make split-second decisions; reasonableness evaluated objectively)
Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 (addressing proof of improper intent and evidentiary burdens)