Nieveen v. TAX 106
311 Neb. 574
| Neb. | 2022Background
- Nieveen failed to pay 2013 property taxes; Lancaster County sold a tax certificate for the property to TAX 106 on March 2, 2015. TAX 106 later assigned the certificate to Vintage Management, LLC (Vintage).
- TAX 106/Vintage sent the statutorily required 3-month notice on March 2, 2018; Vintage received a tax deed in June 2018 after Nieveen did not redeem.
- In 2019 Nieveen sued to quiet title and asserted constitutional claims (due process, takings, excessive fines) and a statutory claim that she was entitled to a 5-year extended redemption under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1827 because she had a “mental disorder” at the time of the 2015 sale.
- At trial Nieveen presented testimony and medical records diagnosing major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety; her treating expert could not opine about her 2015 condition. Vintage’s expert opined there was no evidence she could not manage her affairs in 2015.
- The district court applied the Wisner definition of “mental disorder” (a condition preventing understanding of legal rights or instituting action to protect them) and found Nieveen did not meet that standard; it dismissed her constitutional claims. Nieveen appealed.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed: Nieveen was not entitled to the § 77-1827 extended redemption, and her procedural due process, takings, and excessive-fines challenges failed (relying in part on Continental Resources v. Fair).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entitlement to 5-year extended redemption under § 77-1827 ("mental disorder") | Nieveen argued her diagnosed major depressive disorder and anxiety in 2015 entitled her to the extended redemption period. | County/Vintage argued she did not meet the Wisner definition requiring incapacity to understand or protect legal rights at the time of sale. | Court held Nieveen failed to prove a mental disorder as defined in Wisner (no proof she could not understand or protect her rights), so no extended redemption. |
| Procedural due process — notice and predeprivation hearing | Nieveen argued statutory process denied adequate notice and no mechanism existed to claim the extended redemption before deed issuance. | Defendants argued statutory notice and post-deprivation judicial review satisfied due process; she could have sought injunction before deed issuance. | Court held the three-month notice scheme was adequate (per Continental Resources) and Nieveen had opportunity to be heard but failed to seek preissuance relief. |
| Takings Clause (private purpose or uncompensated taking when equity exceeded tax debt) | Nieveen contended issuance of the tax deed effectuated a taking for private purpose or, at minimum, required compensation because equity exceeded tax debt. | Defendants relied on precedent holding tax-deed procedures do not violate the Takings Clause. | Court dismissed the takings claim, following Continental Resources precedent rejecting the same arguments. |
| Excessive Fines Clause | Nieveen argued losing equity far exceeding the tax debt amounted to an excessive fine. | Defendants argued the tax-deed process is not a punitive fine and is consistent with federal/state precedents. | Court dismissed the excessive-fines claim, applying Continental Resources and treating Nebraska’s clause as coextensive with the federal clause. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wisner v. Vandelay Investments, 300 Neb. 825, 916 N.W.2d 698 (2018) (defines "mental disorder" for § 77-1827 as incapacity preventing understanding or protecting legal rights)
- Continental Resources v. Fair, 971 N.W.2d 313 (Neb. 2022) (upholds tax-certificate/deed procedures against due process, takings, and excessive-fines challenges)
- Sacchi v. Blodig, 215 Neb. 817, 341 N.W.2d 326 (1983) (definition of "insane" as inability to understand legal rights used in statutory interpretation)
- Maycock v. Hoody, 281 Neb. 767, 799 N.W.2d 322 (2011) (statutory interpretation applying incapacity standard)
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (balancing test for required procedural protections)
- United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993) (discusses pre/post-deprivation process and Mathews factors)
- Holste v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 256 Neb. 713, 592 N.W.2d 894 (1999) (holding access to courts and reasonable notice satisfy due process)