370 P.3d 925
Utah2016Background
- A 4-year-9-month-old boy threw a toy dolphin that struck his babysitter (Ms. Nielsen) in the eye, causing total vision loss in that eye after a prior cornea transplant.
- Ms. Nielsen sued the boy (negligence) and his parents (negligent supervision); she conceded no evidence supported parental negligence.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the parents but denied summary judgment as to the child, concluding a four-year-old could potentially be negligent.
- The Utah Supreme Court granted interlocutory review of the denial of summary judgment as to the child and reviewed the legal question de novo.
- The majority adopted the Restatement approach and held as a matter of law that children under five cannot be held liable for negligence, reversing the district court and directing summary judgment for the child.
- A dissent would have preferred a tiered, rebuttable framework based on contemporary cognitive science (categorical immunity under age three; presumption of incapacity ages three–seven; capacity presumed at eight+).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Utah common law recognizes a minimum age below which a child is conclusively incapable of negligence | Nielsen: a 4‑year‑old may be liable; issue should be fact‑specific | Defendant: Utah precedents bar negligence findings for children under seven (or at least under five) | Court: Children under five are, as a matter of law, incapable of negligence; reverse and grant summary judgment for the child |
| Whether Utah follows the Illinois rule (conclusive incapacity <7; rebuttable presumption 7–14) | Nielsen: oppose fixed cutoff; prefer case‑by‑case analysis | Defendant: Illinois rule applies | Court: Rejected adopting the Illinois rule in full; earlier dictum to that effect was not controlling |
| Proper standard for children aged five and older | Nielsen: capacity should be fact question for jury | Defendant: earlier cases support presumption of incapacity for certain ages | Court: For children ≥5, capacity is for the fact‑finder unless no reasonable jury could differ |
| Whether Herald v. Smith establishes a binding rule that <5 cannot be negligent | Nielsen: Herald uncertain or inapplicable | Defendant: Herald supports immunity for ~5‑year‑olds | Court: Treated Herald as controlling precedent supporting a <5 dividing line and relied on it among other cases to adopt the <5 rule |
Key Cases Cited
- Nelson v. Arrowhead Freight Lines, 104 P.2d 225 (Utah 1940) (earlier dictum referencing the Illinois age rule but not controlling)
- Mann v. Fairbourn, 366 P.2d 603 (Utah 1961) (held capacity for negligence of a 5½‑year‑old is a factual question; rejected Nelson dictum)
- Donohue v. Rolando, 400 P.2d 12 (Utah 1965) (treated young children’s capacity as a jury question unless beyond dispute)
- Rivas v. Pacific Finance Co., 397 P.2d 990 (Utah 1964) (held capacity of a child just under six was for the jury)
- Kilpack v. Wignall, 604 P.2d 462 (Utah 1979) (applied a rebuttable presumption regarding a seven‑year‑old’s contributory negligence)
- Herald v. Smith, 190 P. 932 (Utah 1920) (concluded a 4‑year‑10‑month‑old could not be charged with contributory negligence; treated as a legal signpost for the <5 line)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (cited as an example of courts drawing bright‑line age rules for policy reasons)
