Niehaus v. Huppenthal
233 Ariz. 195
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Arizona enacted the Empowerment Scholarship Accounts (ESA) program to provide education scholarships (90% of the base support level) for students with disabilities who previously attended public school or received certain scholarships.
- Parents receiving ESA funds must agree to educate the child in reading, grammar, math, social studies, and science and not enroll the child in a public school while receiving ESA funds.
- ESA funds may be used for a wide range of educational uses (tuition at qualified schools, curricula, tutoring, therapies, online programs, tests, postsecondary tuition, etc.), and may be spent at religious, nonreligious, or public institutions.
- Niehaus challenged the ESA in state court, arguing it violated the Arizona Constitution’s Religion Clause (Art. II, § 12), Aid Clause (Art. IX, § 10), and unlawfully conditioned a public benefit on waiver of a constitutional right; she sought injunctive relief.
- The trial court dismissed part of the complaint, denied injunctive relief, and ruled for the Superintendent; the court of appeals affirmed, reviewing constitutional questions de novo and presuming statutes constitutional.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Religion Clause (Art. II, § 12) — does ESA unlawfully apply public money to religious instruction/establishments? | Niehaus argued ESA would result in public funds reaching religious schools, violating the state Religion Clause. | Huppenthal/Intervenors argued ESA is neutral, channels funds via private parental choice, and does not advance religion. | Court held ESA is neutral, private-choice–driven, does not advance religion, and does not violate the Religion Clause. |
| Aid Clause (Art. IX, § 10) — is ESA an unconstitutional appropriation in aid of private/sectarian schools? | Niehaus contended ESA diverts public education funds to private/sectarian schools in violation of the Aid Clause. | Defendants argued ESA’s specified object is beneficiary families, not schools; funds are not pre- earmarked for private institutions and can be used at public institutions. | Court held ESA does not constitute an appropriation in aid of private/sectarian schools because funds are not earmarked for such schools and beneficiaries control use. |
| Unconstitutional conditions — does ESA condition a public benefit on waiver of constitutional right to public education? | Niehaus argued requiring parents to release public-school enrollment and obligations is an unconstitutional waiver/forfeiture of the right to a free public education. | Defendants argued the restriction merely prevents simultaneous public enrollment while receiving ESA funds; the right is voluntary, reversible, and not permanently forfeited. | Court held the ESA condition is not an unconstitutional waiver: restriction is temporary/reversible, not coercive, and does not permanently surrender the right. |
| Standing / procedural — (alternative defenses) | Niehaus sought relief as plaintiff. | Intervenors and Superintendent argued Niehaus lacked standing on some claims. | Court resolved claims on the merits (found no unconstitutional condition) and did not need to resolve standing for that issue. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kotterman v. Killian, 193 Ariz. 273, 972 P.2d 606 (1999) (upheld neutrality/attenuation analysis for programs benefiting religious schools indirectly and treated tax credit as not an appropriation)
- Cain v. Horne (Cain II), 220 Ariz. 77, 202 P.3d 1178 (2009) (invalidated voucher programs as direct appropriations to private schools under Aid Clause; explained limits of the true-beneficiary argument)
- Community Council v. Jordan, 102 Ariz. 448, 432 P.2d 460 (1967) (rejected blanket ban on channeling public funds through religious organizations; focus on whether funds encourage preference for religion)
- Witters v. State Commission for the Blind, 112 Wash.2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119 (1989) (Washington case holding vocational aid for explicit religious instruction violated state religion clause; relied on by plaintiff but distinguished by court)
