Nicole Maddox v. Babette Stephens, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17456

Background

Nicole Maddox (mother) sued DFCS and social worker Babette Stephens under § 1983 alleging substantive due process violation for interfering with her custodial liberty interest in her infant child J.O., who suffered from a serious medical condition requiring specialized care.
J.O. was discharged from the hospital to the father and the paternal grandmother (the only family member trained to care for the child); Maddox lacked a car, full training, and was then living in Fulton County.
Stephens had informed hospital staff that Gwinnett DFCS could not authorize release to the unlegitimated father and initiated transfer of the case to Fulton County DFCS; the hospital nonetheless discharged J.O. to the father/grandmother.
That night Stephens and the grandmother signed a Safety Plan placing J.O. in the grandmother’s care and instructing the grandmother to contact Stephens/Gwinnett PD if anyone attempted to remove the child; Maddox was not present and had not signed the plan.
Maddox attempted to retrieve J.O.; after police involvement and telephone conversations with Stephens, she was prevented from taking the child; Stephens prepared the Safety Plan and communicated with police, grandmother, and Maddox.
The district court denied Stephens qualified immunity on Maddox’s substantive due process claim; the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding Stephens entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established that her conduct was conscience-shocking.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Stephens violated Maddox’s substantive due process right in interfering with her parental liberty interest by preparing/implementing the Safety Plan and communications that prevented Maddox from retrieving J.O.	Stephens’ Safety Plan and communications unlawfully deprived Maddox of physical custody and prolonged a deprivation without court process, amounting to conscience-shocking interference with parental rights.	Stephens contends she acted to protect a medically fragile child, did not authorize the hospital discharge, reasonably believed Fulton County had jurisdiction, and her conduct was not conscience-shocking.	Held for Stephens: even assuming a constitutional violation, qualified immunity applies because the law was not clearly established that her actions were conscience-shocking in the circumstances.
Whether a reasonable official would have been on notice that failing to trigger juvenile-court proceedings under Georgia law within seven days violated clearly established federal substantive due process rights	Maddox: Georgia statutes and procedures established required steps for deprivation and notice; failure to follow them can show constitutional violation.	Stephens: factual context (hospital-initiated discharge, transfer to Fulton County, grandmother as only trained caregiver) made it reasonable not to initiate Gwinnett court action; procedures were not clearly applicable.	Held for Stephens: it was not clearly established that her conduct violated substantive due process given the unique factual context.
Whether Stephens bore responsibility for the hospital’s discharge decision	Maddox: Stephens’ role in the aftermath contributed to continued deprivation.	Stephens: Hospital made the discharge over DFCS objections; Stephens repeatedly told hospital DFCS could not authorize release.	Held: Stephens did not control the discharge; hospital released the child despite Stephens’ indications.
Whether negligence or procedural lapses suffice for substantive due process liability	Maddox: procedural noncompliance and resulting deprivation supports constitutional claim.	Stephens: mere failure to follow state procedure or non-constitutional negligence is insufficient; substantive due process requires conscience-shocking conduct.	Held: Negligence or procedural lapses alone are not enough; plaintiff must show conscience-shocking conduct, which was not clearly established here.

Key Cases Cited

Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (federal postdeprivation process principles)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (parental liberty interest in custody)
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (parental rights as fundamental liberty interest)
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (limits on substantive due process liability for state inaction)
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (conscience-shocking standard for substantive due process)
Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir.) (qualified immunity framework)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity two-step analysis)
Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528 (11th Cir.) (parallels on child-protection officers and notice issues)
Loftus v. Clark-Moore, 690 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir.) (clearly-established inquiry in context)
Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff’s Office, 329 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir.) (negligence insufficient for substantive due process)