233 So.3d 451
Fla.2018Background
- Nicole Lopez filed for a repeat/dating violence injunction under § 784.046 and obtained a temporary injunction against Sean Hall; the injunction was later extended.
- Hall moved for attorney’s fees and sanctions under § 57.105, alleging Lopez’s petition contained perjured/unsupported claims; Lopez voluntarily dismissed the petition.
- The trial court denied Hall’s § 57.105 motion, ruling § 784.046 contained no authorization to award § 57.105 fees in those proceedings.
- The First District reversed, holding § 57.105 is not precluded in § 784.046 actions and certified conflict with Third and Fifth District decisions (Ratigan, Cisneros, Dudley).
- The Supreme Court of Florida granted review and addressed whether § 57.105 attorney’s fees may be awarded in injunctions under § 784.046.
- The Court held § 57.105 applies to § 784.046 proceedings (they are "civil proceedings or actions"), but recognized practical timing conflicts with the 21‑day safe harbor when temporary injunctions impose a 15‑day hearing deadline.
Issues
| Issue | Lopez's Argument | Hall's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 57.105 applies to injunctions under § 784.046 | § 784.046 proceedings are not "civil proceedings or actions" and thus § 57.105 should not apply | § 57.105 applies broadly to any civil proceeding or action; § 784.046 is a civil cause of action | § 57.105 may be applied to § 784.046 actions when its requirements are met |
| Whether § 784.046’s silence on fees precludes § 57.105 awards | Silence and statutory context (criminal placement, enforcement mechanics) show Legislature did not intend § 57.105 to apply | Silence does not amount to prohibition; § 57.105 contains no exception for § 784.046 | Silence does not prohibit § 57.105 awards; statutory text controls |
| Whether the 21‑day safe harbor in § 57.105 conflicts with § 784.046’s expedited hearing timeline | The 21‑day safe harbor is incompatible with § 784.046’s requirement of a full hearing within 15 days after a temporary injunction, making application impracticable and contrary to legislative intent | Practical conflicts do not negate plain statutory applicability; many situations allow compliance (e.g., extended temporary injunctions); trial court can still award on its own initiative | Timing tension acknowledged but not dispositive; § 57.105 still available though practical limits may apply in some expedited situations |
| Whether applying § 57.105 will chill victims from seeking injunctions | Application will chill pro se petitioners and deter filings; Legislature would have clearly stated such an intent | The statute’s plain language promotes accountability for baseless claims/defenses; safeguards (safe harbor) exist | Dissent raised chilling concerns, but majority declined to adopt that policy argument and left remedy to Legislature if undesired |
Key Cases Cited
- Hall v. Lopez, 213 So. 3d 1003 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (First District decision reversing trial court and certifying conflict)
- Ratigan v. Stone, 947 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (Third District decision limiting application of § 57.105 in similar injunction proceedings)
- Cisneros v. Cisneros, 831 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (Third District decision addressing fees in domestic violence injunction context)
- Dudley v. Schmidt, 963 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (Fifth District decision limiting § 57.105 application in protective injunction proceedings)
- H.K. ex rel. Colton v. Vocelle, 667 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (describing § 784.046 as creating a civil cause of action for a protective injunction)
- Borden v. East‑European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2006) (standard: statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984) (use plain meaning first; resort to construction only if ambiguous)