Nicole Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, LLC
86 A.3d 52
Me.2014Background
- Dussault, a Section 8 voucher recipient, sought a Scarborough apartment owned by Coach Lantern; Coach Lantern initially told her it did not accept vouchers but later accepted her application after she disclosed voucher use.
- Avesta Housing (voucher administrator) informed Coach Lantern that HUD requires a tenancy addendum in any lease for a voucher tenant; Coach Lantern refused to include the HUD tenancy addendum in any of its standard leases.
- Coach Lantern explained its refusal was not because Dussault received public assistance but because the HUD addendum imposed obligations (inspection access, maintenance, rent limits, eviction protections, notification periods) it would not assume.
- Dussault filed a MHRA complaint; the Maine Human Rights Commission found reasonable grounds and she sued in Superior Court seeking relief; the court granted summary judgment to Coach Lantern on direct evidence, disparate treatment, and disparate impact theories.
- The Law Court affirmed: it held Coach Lantern did not refuse to rent or impose different tenancy terms "primarily because of" Dussault’s status, and ruled that the MHRA (as written) does not impose disparate-impact liability for landlords declining to participate in the voluntary Section 8 program.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Coach Lantern "refused to rent" or imposed different terms under 5 M.R.S. § 4582 | Coach Lantern’s blanket refusal to include the HUD tenancy addendum effectively prevented voucher tenants from renting — a refusal to rent because of public assistance status | Coach Lantern offered the unit on the same standard lease terms as others and was willing to rent without the addendum; refusal was due to addendum terms, not tenant status | Court: No unlawful refusal or different terms "primarily because of" status; offering same standard lease means no § 4582 violation |
| Whether plaintiff presented direct evidence/mixed-motive discrimination | Dussault argued voucher status motivated denial of ability to use voucher | Coach Lantern argued the motive was to avoid binding addendum obligations; participation is voluntary | Court: No direct-evidence prima facie; mixed-motive analysis not triggered |
| Whether disparate-treatment (burden-shifting) claim survives summary judgment | Plaintiff contended she made prima facie case | Defendant asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason (refusal to accept addendum) | Court: Plaintiff failed prima facie showing because undisputed facts show no refusal based primarily on status |
| Whether MHRA authorizes disparate-impact liability for landlords refusing Section 8 addendum | Dussault argued MHRA and § 4583 (business necessity) permit disparate-impact claims | Coach Lantern and majority: MHRA’s § 4582 narrowly prohibits refusals/imposition of different terms "primarily because of" status and does not create disparate-impact liability for declining participation in voluntary federal program | Court: MHRA does not create disparate-impact liability in this context; summary judgment for Coach Lantern affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Catir v. Comm’r of Dep’t of Human Servs., 543 A.2d 356 (Me. 1988) (holding provider who stopped accepting Medicaid did not unlawfully impose different terms when it offered same tenancy terms to all)
- Me. Human Rights Comm’n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253 (Me. 1979) (adopting burden-shifting disparate-impact framework in Maine law)
- Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (federal recognition of disparate-impact liability under Title VII)
- Patten v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc., 300 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussion of mixed-motive/direct-evidence analysis in discrimination claims)