Nicole Aquino Williamson v. Paul Landon Lamm
M2015-02006-COA-R3-CV
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Sep 30, 2016Background
- Parents divorced in 2011; their agreed permanent parenting plan gave each equal parenting time on alternating weeks and named Mother primary residential parent. Their son, Landon, was under 2 at divorce.
- The plan contemplated deciding school placement jointly when Landon reached school age; parties agreed Landon would attend high school where Father taught.
- Mother filed petitions (2012, amended 2013) seeking modification once Landon approached school age; parties attempted mediation and agreed to defer scheduling until the May before kindergarten.
- By June 2015, parents submitted competing parenting plans: Mother proposed Landon live with her during the school year (Father every other weekend) and Father proposed Landon live with him during the school year (Mother every other weekend); Father’s plan named him primary residential parent.
- Trial court (June 2015) changed primary residential parent to Father for the 2015–2016 school year, adopted a week-with-Father/downtime-with-Mother schedule, ordered child support from Mother, and invited Mother to refile later without proving material change. Mother appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Williamson) | Defendant's Argument (Lamm) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court correctly assessed Mother's credibility about work schedule | Mother said her work schedule allowed daily school drop-off/pick-up and flexibility for parenting | Father contested Mother’s credibility and argued his schedule provided more stability | Court declined to overturn credibility finding; nevertheless held credibility issue non-dispositive and did not affect outcome |
| Whether a material change in circumstances justified changing the primary residential parent | Mother argued child reaching school age and inability to agree on school warranted modification to make her primary resident | Father argued change warranted transferring primary residence to him for stability; he also submitted competing plan | Court held preponderance did not show material change sufficient to change primary residential parent — child aging and limited incidents did not meet high standard |
| Whether a material change justified modifying the residential parenting schedule | Mother argued original alternating-week schedule was unworkable given distance and school enrollment needs; sought schedule favoring her during school year | Father argued his plan provided stability and better parenting time during school year | Court held evidence met the lower threshold for modifying the residential parenting schedule because the alternating-week plan was unworkable given distance, school needs, and lack of agreement |
| Whether the court correctly applied best-interest analysis and procedure | Mother contended court erred by jumping to best-interest without finding statutorily required material change and by inviting future petitions without the material-change requirement | Father advocated for immediate best-interest focus and implementation of his plan | Court ruled trial court erred procedurally by failing to find material change for custody and by allowing future petitions without the statutory standard; remanded for best-interest determination limited to modifying the residential schedule |
Key Cases Cited
- Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685 (Tenn. 2013) (standard of review and material-change framework)
- Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2013) (appellate review of factual findings when trial court fails to make required findings)
- Cranston v. Combs, 106 S.W.3d 641 (Tenn. 2003) (two-step analysis: material change then best interest)
- Kendrick v. Shoemake, 90 S.W.3d 566 (Tenn. 2002) (factors to evaluate material change for custody)
- Boyer v. Heimermann, 238 S.W.3d 249 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (lower threshold for modifying residential parenting schedule)
- Caldwell v. Hill, 250 S.W.3d 865 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (burden to prove material change by preponderance)
- Rigsby v. Edmonds, 395 S.W.3d 728 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (child’s aging alone insufficient to support change of primary residential parent)