Nicolas v. Attorney General of the State of Maryland, 820 F.3d 124

In 1996 Richard Nicolas was convicted in Maryland for the murder of his two‑year‑old daughter; the State’s case relied heavily on the medical examiner’s lividity testimony placing time of death roughly two hours before the child was found.
Nicolas maintained he was with the child until about 9:45 p.m.; the State argued he shot her earlier, left her in the car, then attended an earlier movie showing.
Years later, through a public‑records request, defense counsel obtained police notes of two hotel guests (Benson and McKinsey) who said they heard a loud bang near the time Nicolas claimed the shooting occurred; these statements had not been disclosed to the defense at trial.
Nicolas raised a Brady claim in state post‑conviction proceedings; state courts concluded the undisclosed statements were not favorable or material and denied relief.
The federal district court granted habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, finding the statements favorable and material given the centrality of lividity testimony; the State appealed.
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that under AEDPA the state courts’ determination that the undisclosed statements were not material was not unreasonable.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the State’s nondisclosure of Benson and McKinsey’s statements violated Brady (favorability and materiality)	The statements corroborate Nicolas’s timeline and would undermine the ME’s lividity‑based time‑of‑death, thus favorable and material.	The statements are unreliable, equivocal, tied to a different location, and at best conflict with the State’s theory; they would not undermine confidence in the verdict.	The Fourth Circuit assumed favorability but held the state courts reasonably concluded the statements were not material when considered with the whole record.
Whether the state courts’ Brady rulings were unreasonable under AEDPA	State courts unreasonably ignored the centrality of lividity and the prosecutors’ post‑trial letters showing reliance on that evidence.	Under AEDPA, federal courts must defer; the state courts reasonably evaluated the statements against all trial evidence.	The state courts’ rulings were not objectively unreasonable; federal habeas relief was improper.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (suppression of favorable evidence violates due process)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (materiality standard: evidence that could put case in different light undermining confidence in verdict)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (no distinction between impeachment and exculpatory Brady material)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (AEDPA deference; relief only for unreasonable state‑court decisions)
Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (look‑through rule for summary denials and review of last reasoned state decision)
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (silent appellate affirmances imply adoption of lower court reasoning)