Nickey Brown v. Oil States Skagit Smatco
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24231
5th Cir.2011Background
- Brown, African-American former contract welder for Oil States Skagit Smatco entities, employed Mar 12–Jun 11, 2008, and resigned alleging racial harassment and life-threatening conduct.
- Brown filed a Title VII complaint in the Eastern District of Louisiana on Jun 16, 2009, proceeding IFP.
- In a Jan 5, 2010 deposition in a separate personal injury action, Brown testified he left Oil States solely due to back pain from an accident; he did not mention harassment.
- In a May 26, 2010 deposition in the Title VII case, Brown testified he quit solely because of racial harassment; he did not mention back pain.
- Oil States filed a July 23, 2010 motion for sanctions alleging perjury; the district court found perjury and dismissed Brown’s complaint with prejudice.
- The magistrate judge recommended dismissal with prejudice; Brown challenged, sought an evidentiary hearing, and Brown and counsel were separately sanctioned; the district court adopted the Report on Oct 25, 2010, dismissing with prejudice; Wilson sought recusal which the district court denied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether dismissal with prejudice was appropriate sanctions given perjury. | Brown argues lesser sanctions were available. | Oil States argues perjury warrants dismissal with prejudice. | No abuse of discretion; dismissal upheld. |
| Whether the district court properly denied an evidentiary hearing on conflicting testimony. | Brown requested an evidentiary hearing to explain conflicting deposition testimony. | Court need not hold another hearing. | No abuse; hearing not required. |
| Whether the magistrate judge should have been recused from Wilson’s show-cause matter. | Wilson contends judge had to recuse due to personal knowledge of disputed facts. | No disqualifying personal bias. | No abuse of discretion; recusal not warranted. |
| Whether district court properly considered lesser sanctions before imposing dismissal. | Lesser sanctions (e.g., fraud finding) were appropriate. | Lesser sanctions insufficient to deter perjury; dismissal appropriate. | District court did not abuse; dismissal with prejudice warranted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (U.S. Supreme Court 1991) (severe sanctions within court's discretion in response to misconduct)
- Hull v. Municipality of San Juan, 356 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2004) (perjury and deceit justify strong sanctions for deterrence)
- McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1988) (contumacious conduct justifies dismissal with prejudice)
- Gonzalez v. Trinity Marine Grp., Inc., 117 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 1997) (courts must use least onerous sanction; persistent misrepresentation may require dismissal)
- Topalian v. Ehrman, 3 F.3d 931 (5th Cir. 1993) (sanctions must be proportionate and not vindictive; show deterrence)
- Brinkmann v. Dallas Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1987) (dismissal with prejudice as a major sanction when warranted by conduct)
- Sturgeon v. Airborne Freight Corp., 778 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1985) (use of dismissal when lesser sanctions ineffective)
- Woodson v. Surgitek, Inc., 57 F.3d 1406 (5th Cir. 1995) (perjury and deceit undermine integrity of proceedings; dismissal may be appropriate)