313 So.3d 346
La. Ct. App.2021Background
- Nick Loeb and Sofia Vergara underwent IVF in California; two viable female embryos were created and cryopreserved at a California clinic (ART). The embryos never left California.
- Loeb later filed suit in California (2014) seeking custody of the embryos; that action was dismissed without prejudice in 2016. Loeb then created a Louisiana trust for the embryos and filed a custody action in Louisiana (25th JDC, Plaquemines Parish) in January 2018 asserting UCCJEA jurisdiction. Vergara had pending litigation in California seeking enforcement of the IVF contract requiring mutual consent for embryo transfer.
- Vergara filed multiple exceptions in Louisiana (personal jurisdiction, venue, subject-matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, lis pendens, nonjoinder of ART, etc.). The trial court sustained all exceptions, dismissed the Louisiana suit with prejudice, and partially sealed the record; the appellate court modified the sealing order.
- Key legal conflict: whether the UCCJEA (which uses the term “child”) applies to in vitro embryos (which Louisiana’s Human Embryo Statutes treat as a special juridical/biological category), and whether Louisiana courts have jurisdiction or venue over parties and embryos physically and contractually tied to California.
- On appeal the Fourth Circuit: (1) reversed the trial court’s broad sealing order and unsealed the record except for redactions; (2) affirmed dismissal on venue, personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction (UCCJEA inapplicable to pre-implantation embryos), and nonjoinder of ART; but (3) amended the dismissal as to nonjoinder to be without prejudice and clarified that lis pendens supports staying (not dismissing) under La. C.C.P. art. 532.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Loeb) | Defendant's Argument (Vergara) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the UCCJEA provide subject-matter jurisdiction over custody of IVF embryos located in another state? | UCCJEA applies; embryos are children/unborn persons for custody purposes, so Louisiana may exercise jurisdiction (Loeb claims embryos domiciled in LA via his residency). | UCCJEA defines “child” as an individual under 18 and requires a home state; an unimplanted embryo is not a “child” under UCCJEA and all operative events occurred in California. | Held: UCCJEA does not apply to pre-implantation embryos; trial court correctly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on that basis. |
| Is venue in Plaquemines Parish proper under the child-custody venue provision (La. C.C.P. art. 74.2) given Loeb’s claimed Louisiana domicile? | Loeb alleged domicile/residence in Plaquemines Parish and urged the custody-venue exception. | Vergara produced evidence showing Loeb’s ties (financial, travel, residences, AMEX records, agents) pointed to NY/FL/Spain/California; the Plaquemines addresses were contrived to permit filing in Louisiana. | Held: Trial court properly sustained Vergara’s exception of improper venue; record showed no genuine domicile/residence intent in LA. |
| Does Louisiana have personal jurisdiction over Vergara for this dispute? | Loeb argued jurisdictional bases via the custody claim and asserted venue/domicile ties. | Vergara argued no minimum contacts with LA (all IVF acts and embryo custody/control arose in California) and she is a CA resident. | Held: No general or specific jurisdiction over Vergara; Louisiana courts lacked personal jurisdiction. |
| Must ART (the California clinic) be joined as an indispensable/necessary party? | Loeb argued ART was not required for his custody claim. | Vergara argued ART has a direct, statutory custodial/safekeeping interest (La. R.S. 9:127), and its absence would prejudice parties and risk inconsistent obligations. | Held: ART has an interest; trial court correctly held nonjoinder was fatal to proceeding in Louisiana; dismissal without prejudice was rendered (trial court had erred by dismissing with prejudice). |
Key Cases Cited
- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (establishes minimum contacts due process standard for personal jurisdiction)
- Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (general jurisdiction requires contacts so continuous/systematic as to render defendant at home)
- Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (clarifies limits on general jurisdiction for corporations and individuals)
- Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (specific jurisdiction requires connection between forum and underlying controversy)
- Amoco Prod. Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 487 So. 2d 575 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (art. 532 permits stay—not dismissal—when earlier suit is in a foreign or federal court)
- Copeland v. Copeland, 966 So. 2d 1040 (La. 2007) (public right of access to court records; sealing orders must be narrowly tailored)
- Waltenburg v. Waltenburg, 270 S.W.3d 308 (Tex. App.) (UCCJEA does not apply to unborn child/embryo)
- Arnold v. Price, 365 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. App.) (same conclusion: UCCJEA not applicable to unborn children)
- Fleckles v. Diamond, 35 N.E.3d 176 (Ill. App. Ct.) (UCCJEA inapplicable to unborn children)
- Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cox, 82 S.W.3d 806 (Ark.) (UCCJEA does not apply to unborn infants)