Nichols v. State Ex Rel. Department of Public Safety
2017 Okla. LEXIS 20
| Okla. | 2017Background
- Nathan D. Nichols Jr. was arrested for DUI on May 8, 2013, and requested an administrative hearing on May 20, 2013.
- OSBI blood-test results establishing intoxication were delivered to the Department of Public Safety (DPS) on September 6, 2013.
- DPS delayed issuing a notice of revocation until January 18, 2014, and held the administrative revocation hearing on September 16, 2014 — ~16 months after Nichols’ first hearing request.
- Nichols did not contest the arrest or test results; he argued his Oklahoma Constitutional right to a speedy hearing (Okla. Const. art. 2, §6) was violated.
- The trial court sustained Nichols’ appeal, set aside the revocation and reinstated his license; the Court of Civil Appeals reversed; the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 16-month delay violated the Oklahoma Constitution’s right to a speedy hearing | Nichols: delay measured from his first request (May 20, 2013); 16-month delay violated art. 2, §6 | DPS: first request was "premature" under 47 O.S. §754(D); speedy period should run from DPS notice (Jan/Feb 2014); budget/personnel issues justify delay | Held: Violation. Court measured from Nichols’ first request; DPS cannot manipulate notice timing to avoid speedy-trial obligations; personnel/budgetary constraints are not a valid excuse |
| Proper start date for speedy-trial calculation in revocation proceedings | Nichols: use initial timely request to trigger right to a hearing | DPS: statute allows treating requests before notice as premature; therefore later date controls | Held: Start date is the driver’s timely request; DPS may not delay issuing notice to alter the calculation |
| Whether DPS’s possession of evidence and witness availability affect speedy-trial calculus | Nichols: DPS had lab results by Sept 6, 2013 and the trooper was available; DPS could have proceeded earlier | DPS: availability and scheduling realities mitigate delay | Held: These facts weigh against DPS; possession of evidence and witness availability mean DPS’ prolonged delay was unreasonable |
| Whether prejudice exists where driving privileges were not actually suspended | Nichols: prejudice arises from prolonged uncertainty and potential loss of property interest | DPS: absence of an actual suspension means insufficient prejudice | Held: Prejudice exists — the prolonged limbo over driving privileges satisfies the prejudice factor |
Key Cases Cited
- Pierce v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 327 P.3d 530 (Okla. 2014) (establishes de novo review and four-factor speedy-hearing test applied to administrative revocation)
- Ellis v. State, 76 P.3d 1131 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003) (discusses speedy-trial and prejudice considerations)
- Wester v. Lucas, 57 P.2d 1179 (Okla. 1936) (attorney statements in court may constitute admissions)