NICHOLS v. ASPIRE INDIANA, INC., 1:17-cv-01678

Tonya Nichols, 58 and the only African-American in her department, worked at Aspire for 26 years as a Marketing Development Associate and alleged exemplary performance until a 2016 supervisor change.
On June 6, 2016 Nichols and a coworker received a verbal reprimand for alleged attitude/behavior; no prior warnings had been given.
On August 9, 2016 Nichols was suspended with pay pending investigation for alleged falsification of mileage reports related to Rotary Club attendance; a similarly situated white employee was not asked to verify mileage.
On the morning of August 12, 2016 Nichols filed an EEOC charge alleging race and age discrimination based on the reprimand and suspension; later that day Aspire terminated her.
Nichols received a right-to-sue notice in February 2017 and filed this lawsuit asserting Title VII and ADEA claims; Aspire moved to dismiss arguing Nichols failed to plead an adverse employment action and that termination was outside her EEOC charge.
The court denied dismissal, finding the termination was reasonably related to the EEOC charge and that whether the suspension constituted an adverse action required factual development; the verbal reprimand alone is insufficient as a matter of law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Nichols exhausted administrative remedies for her termination	The termination flowed from the same suspension alleged in the EEOC charge and thus is reasonably related	Termination was not in the EEOC charge and therefore barred	Held: Termination reasonably related to charge; exhaustion satisfied
Whether suspension with pay is an adverse employment action	Suspension and immediate deprivations (access, keys, laptop) were material changes supporting discrimination claim	A paid suspension without loss of pay/benefits is not, as a matter of law, an adverse action	Held: Cannot decide as a matter of law; factual development required
Whether verbal reprimand is an adverse employment action	Reprimand formed part of discriminatory treatment	Verbal reprimand is not a materially adverse employment action	Held: Verbal reprimand alone does not constitute an adverse employment action
Whether plaintiff stated plausible discrimination claims to survive Rule 12(b)(6)	Facts plausibly infer discriminatory termination and disparate treatment	Complaint fails to allege essential element (adverse action) and should be dismissed	Held: Complaint sufficiently alleges adverse action (termination) and survives dismissal; further factual issues remain

Lake v. Neal, 585 F.3d 1059 (7th Cir. 2009) (pleading standard at motion to dismiss)
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007) (notice pleading requirements)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for complaints)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (reasonable inference and plausibility framework)
Whitaker v. Milwaukee County, 772 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (EEOC-charge exhaustion—reasonable relation test)
Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1994) (factual relationship requirement for EEOC-charge coverage)
Isaacs v. Hill’s Pet Nutrition, Inc., 485 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 2007) (post-charge events reasonably discovered in EEOC investigation)
Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2016) (definition of materially adverse employment action)
Andrews v. CBOCS West, Inc., 743 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 2014) (adverse action standard)
Lewis v. City of Chi., 496 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2007) (examples of significant changes in employment status)
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2011) (verbal reprimand not a materially adverse action)