Nicholaus Knecht v. State of Indiana
85 N.E.3d 829
Ind. Ct. App.2017Background
- Knecht pleaded guilty in Feb 2013 to several offenses and received a six-year aggregate sentence suspended to probation.
- While on probation he was later criminally charged with child molesting; the criminal jury found him not guilty in Dec 2015.
- The State filed an amended petition to revoke probation alleging Knecht committed acts constituting child molesting and contributing to the delinquency of a minor (and alleged reckless driving, which the court found unsupported).
- At the revocation hearing the alleged victim (H.W.) did not testify; the State introduced her transcript from the criminal trial over Knecht’s hearsay/confrontation objection; Knecht similarly introduced his trial testimony.
- The trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Knecht committed child molesting and contributing to delinquency, revoked probation, and ordered execution of the suspended six-year sentence in community corrections.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether admission of the victim’s criminal-trial transcript violated Knecht’s confrontation/due process rights | State: transcript admissible where transcript reliable and revocation due-process standards differ from criminal trial | Knecht: transcript was hearsay/testimonial; admitting it denied right to confront and cross-examine a witness | Admission upheld: confrontation rights in revocation are limited; prior live cross-examination at the criminal trial and testimonial reliability supplied substantial guarantees of trustworthiness, so due process was satisfied |
| Whether revocation violated double jeopardy | State: revocation is civil and not a second criminal punishment | Knecht: revocation for same conduct that produced acquittal amounts to double jeopardy | Rejected: probation revocation is civil (preponderance standard) and not barred by Double Jeopardy Clause |
| Sufficiency of evidence to revoke for child molesting after acquittal | State: evidence from criminal trial (and limited additional testimony) supported revocation by preponderance | Knecht: acquittal and lack of new evidence make revocation unsupported | Affirmed: court may consider prior trial evidence; judge credited victim’s account and State met preponderance requirement |
| Sufficiency of evidence to revoke for contributing to delinquency (curfew violation) | State: Knecht, over 18, aided/transported under-15 minor after 11 p.m. — supports contributing charge | Knecht: he merely had presence; did not entice or induce the minor to leave home | Affirmed: picking up and transporting the minor constituted at least “aid”/facilitation of curfew violation, satisfying the statute |
Key Cases Cited
- Debro v. State, 821 N.E.2d 367 (Ind. 2005) (due process limits apply in probation revocation)
- Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547 (Ind. 1999) (procedural protections in revocation context)
- Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (U.S. 1985) (due process in probation revocation)
- Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 2008) (minimum due process requirements at revocation hearings)
- Lightcap v. State, 863 N.E.2d 907 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (prior trial testimony admissible in revocation where defendant had opportunity to cross-examine)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (U.S. 1973) (permitting hearsay substitutes at revocation hearings where appropriate)
- Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438 (Ind. 2007) (State must show good cause and trustworthiness for hearsay at revocation)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (limits on admission of testimonial statements in criminal trials; distinguished in revocation context)
- Owings v. State, 622 N.E.2d 948 (Ind. 1993) (testimony under oath has indicia of reliability)
- Thornton v. State, 792 N.E.2d 94 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (acquittal does not preclude revocation if preponderance standard met)
- Johnson v. State, 512 N.E.2d 1090 (Ind. 1987) (probation violation is not an offense for double jeopardy purposes)