Nicholas Vincent Russo v. Maria Camila Bernal, 03-17-00551-CV

Background

Plaintiff Maria Camila Bernal (a TV reporter) sought a lifetime protective order under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 7A.03 and Penal Code § 42.072 alleging stalking by defendant Nicholas Russo.
Russo and Bernal worked together in Midland (2014–Feb 2015), socialized occasionally, then Russo moved out of state in Feb 2015; they had minimal direct electronic contact thereafter and no recent in‑person contact until Russo returned briefly to Austin in Jan 2017.
The key alleged events: social media interactions (likes/shares), a few texts (one asking for help while hospitalized; one where Bernal asked Russo to stop contacting her), and a Jan 9, 2017 bar encounter where Russo spoke with a coworker of Bernal’s while visiting Austin.
Austin PD Officer McCloud interviewed Russo after Bernal reported fear; McCloud found no evidence of threats or assaults and did not arrest Russo, though he believed Russo might pose a future risk.
The trial court found a “continuum of actions” constituted stalking and issued a lifetime protective order prohibiting Russo from contacting Bernal and from approaching within 200 yards; Russo appealed, arguing legal and factual insufficiency.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether evidence legally/factually sufficient to support lifetime stalking protective order under art. 7A.03/§ 42.072	Bernal (State) argued Russo’s repeated social media actions, limited texts, and the 2017 visit formed a course of conduct that alarmed Bernal and would cause a reasonable person to feel harassed or fear harm	Russo argued there was no intent to harass, no repeated electronic communications directed at Bernal, no threats or assaults, and insufficient proof he knew or should have known his conduct would be regarded as threatening	Appellate review required legal and factual sufficiency analysis; trial judge relied on contextual “continuum” to find stalking—Russo contends that finding lacks evidence as to § 42.072(a)(1) (harassment or knowing/threatening conduct) and must be vacated
Whether alleged conduct satisfied harassment element of § 42.07(a)(7) (intentional repeated electronic communications)	State relied on social media likes/shares and third‑party forwards as repeated electronic communications that harassed Bernal	Russo argued nearly all communications were public posts or third‑party forwards, only two direct electronic communications existed, and there was no intent to harass	Court below credited context as threatening; appellant argues no scintilla of evidence shows requisite intent for harassment
Whether conduct was "knowingly" threatening under § 42.072(a)(1) (actor knew or reasonably should know victim would regard conduct as threatening bodily injury/death/property damage)	State argued the pattern of conduct could be viewed in context as implicitly threatening	Russo emphasized absence of explicit threats, assaults, prior unwanted physical contact, and that he largely respected Bernal’s requests (he moved away; left town after contact)	Trial judge found implicit threat via contextual assessment; Russo argues record lacks evidence he knew his conduct would be regarded as threatening and that Bernal’s subjective fear is insufficient
Scope and permanence of relief (lifetime order) and impact on defendant’s liberty/profession	State sought broad lifetime protection under art. 7A based on reasonable grounds of stalking	Russo argued lifetime order is draconian given lack of evidence and will unduly harm his career (same employer)	Trial court issued lifetime order; appellant challenges its legal/factual basis and asks appellate court to vacate

Key Cases Cited

Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. 1998) (standards for legal‑sufficiency review)
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (standards for reviewing sufficiency of evidence and reasonable inferences)
Shoemaker v. State for Protection of C.L., 493 S.W.3d 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (trial court acts as factfinder for protective order sufficiency review)
In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249 (Tex. 2000) (standards for reviewing protective‑order evidence)
McGowan v. State, 375 S.W.3d 585 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012) (contrast: sustained stalking conviction where persistent unwanted contact, explicit threats, and surveillance forced victim to move)
Havner v. E‑Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1992) (appellate deference to factfinder on competing inferences)