Nicholas Maslonka v. Bonita Hoffner, 900 F.3d 269

Background

In 2008 Maslonka robbed banks; convicted in Michigan as a third habitual offender and sentenced to 15–25 years after pleading guilty. He had negotiated a conditional, more favorable state plea (dismissal of fourth-habitual-offender charge) contingent on "very best" federal cooperation (including grand‑jury testimony).
Maslonka met repeatedly with DEA agents and AUSAs without his state-appointed trial counsel present; he ultimately did not testify before the federal grand jury and the state prosecutor rescinded the more favorable offer.
Maslonka pleaded guilty as a third habitual offender. He later raised ineffective-assistance claims against his trial counsel (and appellate counsel) in state and federal habeas proceedings; the district court granted habeas relief on the trial-counsel claim.
The Sixth Circuit reviewed de novo (concluding state court denial was procedural and not on the merits) and assumed arguendo counsel’s performance was deficient but analyzed prejudice under Strickland/Frye.
The court held Maslonka failed to prove prejudice: he could not show a reasonable probability he would have testified before the grand jury or that the prosecutor would have preserved the earlier plea even if counsel had acted differently.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of habeas relief on the trial-counsel claim and remanded for consideration only of Maslonka’s ineffective‑assistance‑of‑appellate‑counsel claims.

Issues

Issue	Maslonka's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether trial counsel’s absence during federal cooperation proceedings amounted to a constructive denial of counsel under Cronic	Counsel’s absence at all cooperation stages deprived him of counsel at a critical stage, so prejudice should be presumed	Cronic applies only where the state or its actors prevented counsel’s participation; mere absence by counsel does not trigger Cronic	Rejected Cronic theory; counsel’s personal absence does not automatically equal constructive denial where state did not prevent counsel’s involvement
Whether counsel was ineffective under Strickland for failing to meaningfully consult/advocate during plea-cooperation negotiations	Counsel failed to formalize cooperation, attend meetings, advise limits, or pursue relief at sentencing, constituting deficient performance	Even assuming deficiency, any error did not prejudice Maslonka because he likely would still have refused to testify and prosecutor would have withdrawn the offer	Assumed deficiency for purposes of decision but found no prejudice under Strickland/Frye; habeas relief not warranted on this claim
Whether Maslonka procedurally defaulted his ineffective-assistance claims in state court	Waiver/forfeiture arguments aside, claims should be considered on the merits	State argued claims were procedurally defaulted under Mich. Ct. R. 6.502(G)	State had expressly waived procedural-default defense in its initial habeas answer; federal court did not enforce the procedural bar and reviewed merits de novo
Standard of federal review (AEDPA deference) — whether state court adjudicated claims on the merits	Maslonka urged plenary review because state court applied procedural bar	State argued Harrington presumption of merits adjudication should apply	Court concluded state-court order invoked state procedural rule and did not adjudicate merits; de novo review applied

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance two-part test)
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (constructive denial of counsel and narrow exceptions to prejudice requirement)
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (plea negotiations are a critical stage; prejudice framework for lost plea bargains)
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (prejudice test in plea context; outcome would have been different)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (presumption about whether state court adjudicated claims on the merits)
Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (AEDPA deference and when de novo review applies)
Mitchell v. Mason, 325 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.) (circumstances in which Cronic applies when court or state actors contributed to denial of counsel)