Newton v. Ragland
325 Ga. App. 371
| Ga. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- On March 22, 2009 Amanda Newton ran a red light and severely injured Steve Ragland. Two liability policies (USAA and Zurich) each had $25,000 per-person limits; Ragland also had $175,000 UM coverage.
- On July 27, 2009 Ragland’s counsel demanded combined policy limits ($50,000) in exchange for a limited liability release under OCGA § 33-24-41.1, with a deadline of August 7, 2009 at noon.
- On August 6, 2009 USAA mailed a $25,000 check and a general (full) release form to Ragland’s counsel and asked that the release be "completed" and witnesses be present.
- Ragland’s counsel acknowledged receipt before the deadline but did not expressly accept USAA’s release form; later counsel returned USAA’s check when Ragland changed attorneys and filed suit on August 10, 2009.
- Newton (defendant) moved to enforce the settlement; the trial court denied the motion and found Ragland entitled to attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68. The appellate court reversed, holding a binding settlement was formed when USAA timely tendered the policy-limit check.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Ragland) | Defendant's Argument (Newton/USAA) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a binding settlement was formed when USAA tendered policy-limit payment accompanied by a general release | Payment was not unconditional acceptance because the release sent was a general release, not the limited liability release specified; thus no mutual assent | Tendering the check by the deadline constituted acceptance of Ragland’s unilateral offer; inclusion of a general release and precatory language did not impose a new condition | Acceptance occurred on tender; settlement enforced despite general release being included |
| Whether USAA’s letter and release constituted a counteroffer rather than acceptance | The additional release terms amounted to new conditions, so USAA counteroffered | The letter used precatory wording and did not condition payment on execution of that specific release form, so it was not a counteroffer | No counteroffer; language was precatory and did not negate acceptance |
| Whether post-tender communications (fax by Ragland’s counsel) could prevent formation of contract | Post-tender objections meant Ragland did not accept the terms and thus no contract | Acceptance occurred when USAA performed (tendered payment); later communications cannot undo a formed contract | Post-tender communications did not prevent contract formation |
| Whether Ragland was entitled to attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68 given the court’s denial of enforcement | Fee award justified by trial court’s ruling in plaintiff’s favor on enforceability | Because settlement should have been enforced, fee award must be reversed | Fee award reversed along with judgment; enforcement in favor of USAA/defendant |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. DeKalb County, 314 Ga. App. 790 (court reviews motion to enforce settlement de novo; standard analogous to summary judgment)
- Greenwald v. Kersh, 275 Ga. App. 724 (law favors enforcement of definite settlement agreements)
- Sherman v. Dickey, 322 Ga. App. 228 (settlement requires mutual agreement on terms; acceptances must be unconditional and identical)
- Turner v. Williamson, 321 Ga. App. 209 (inclusion of an unacceptable release form and precatory language did not prevent formation of settlement when check was timely tendered)
- Herring v. Dunning, 213 Ga. App. 695 (distinction between precatory language and mandatory conditions in acceptance)
- Frickey v. Jones, 280 Ga. 573 (acceptance conditioned on resolving unspecified medical liens constituted a counteroffer)
- Anderson v. Benton, 295 Ga. App. 851 (acceptance expressly contingent on execution of a release noncompliant with offer constitutes counteroffer)