Newton v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 3:21-cv-00373-SDD-RLB

Plaintiff Terrence K. Newton, Sr., a former Illinois Central Railroad (IC) foreman, alleges he was denied advancement after reporting a noose on company premises and was later suspended without pay and terminated following an "authority"/operating error.
Newton identifies two white foremen (Wendell Moak and Miles Moreman) who suffered more serious incidents (a derailment and a work-related accident) but were allegedly investigated while paid and not terminated.
Newton pleaded a Title VII disparate-treatment claim and various state-law and retaliation claims; he later conceded the state-law and retaliation claims in opposition to IC’s motion.
The district court found Newton failed to plead that he is a member of a protected class and failed to allege a proper "similarly situated" comparator whose conduct, supervisor, responsibilities, and disciplinary histories were "nearly identical."
The court dismissed Newton’s state-law and retaliation claims with prejudice and dismissed his Title VII disparate-treatment claim without prejudice, granting leave to amend to cure the pleading defects by September 29, 2023 (failure to amend would result in dismissal with prejudice).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Pleading standard for Title VII disparate-treatment at 12(b)(6)	Newton contends he has pleaded a prima facie case and may rely on McDonnell Douglas framework	IC urges stricter comparator- and-factual pleading to make claim plausible	Court applies Swierkiewicz/Twombly/Iqbal line: plaintiff must plead the ultimate elements plausibly; McDonnell is not the pleading rubric but may inform plausibility analysis
Adequacy of alleging protected class	Newton alleges he is a "member of a protected class" (conclusory)	IC points out no factual allegation of race or protected status	Court held Newton failed to plead protected-class membership; this is a glaring deficiency and justifies dismissal unless amended
Sufficiency of comparator allegations	Newton identifies Moak and Moreman as white comparators treated more favorably	IC argues their conduct and supervision differ materially from Newton’s conduct	Court held Newton failed to allege nearly identical circumstances (different misconduct, no same supervisor, noncomparable histories); comparator allegations inadequate
State-law and retaliation claims	Newton initially pleaded them but later conceded	IC moved to dismiss them as prescribed and unexhausted	Court dismissed state-law and retaliation claims with prejudice (waived by concession)

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleadings under Rule 8)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions not entitled to assumption of truth; apply Twombly plausibility analysis)
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (plaintiff need not plead McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, but must allege ultimate elements plausibly)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (familiar burden-shifting framework for proving disparate treatment at summary/jury stages)
Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2019) (Swierkiewicz governs pleading; plaintiff must plead ultimate elements; McDonnell can be helpful)
Chhim v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 836 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2016) (plaintiff must plead sufficient facts on ultimate elements to make disparate-treatment claim plausible)
Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253 (5th Cir. 2009) (comparator analysis: "nearly identical" circumstances required)
Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. Co., 851 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2017) (plaintiff must show he was treated less favorably than others outside protected class)
Raj v. Louisiana State Univ., 714 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2013) (Swierkiewicz and ultimate-elements pleading applied in Title VII context)
Olivarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 997 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2021) (discussing interplay of pleading standards and McDonnell Douglas at pleading stage)