Newland v. Cnty. of L. A., 24 Cal. App. 5th 676

Deputy public defender Donald Prigo regularly used his personal car for off-site job duties (branch courts, jail visits, crime scenes), averaging 8–10 work days per month with such use, but he did not need his car for routine in‑office days.
On February 28, 2013, Prigo drove home after work from the Norwalk Courthouse; he had no off‑site duties that day and was turning into a nearby post office when his car collided with another vehicle, injuring a pedestrian (Newland).
Newland sued Prigo and Los Angeles County; after bifurcated trial the jury found the County either expressly or impliedly required Prigo to use his personal vehicle and returned a large verdict against the County.
The trial court refused to give standard vicarious‑liability instructions requiring the jury to find Prigo was acting within the course and scope of employment at the time of the accident, and instead submitted a special verdict focused on whether the County required Prigo to use his personal vehicle or benefited from its availability.
The County moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV); the trial court denied the motion and entry of judgment followed. The County appealed.

Issue	Newland's Argument	County's Argument	Held
Whether the "required vehicle" (vehicle‑use) exception to the going‑and‑coming rule makes the County vicariously liable for Prigo's commute accident	Newland argued Prigo was regularly required or expected to make his car available for work, so the employer benefitted from that availability and the exception applies	County argued Prigo was on an ordinary commute on a day he had no off‑site duties, was not required to have his car that day, and the County received no benefit from his driving that day	Court held no substantial evidence that Prigo was driving in the course and scope of employment at the time of the accident; the required‑vehicle exception did not apply and employer not vicariously liable
Whether the trial court erred by refusing vicarious‑liability instructions and by using Newland's special verdict form	Newland relied on the special verdict questions that omitted requiring a finding the employee was acting within the course and scope at the accident time	County argued the jury should have been instructed and required to find Prigo was acting within the course and scope at the time of the crash; the special verdict omitted the relevant temporal element	Court found the temporal element is critical; because jury verdict lacked substantial evidence of course‑and‑scope at time of injury, JNOV should have been granted and judgment reversed

Smith v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 69 Cal.2d 814 (Cal. 1968) (establishes that employer requirement to bring a car to work can place commute within course of employment)
Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 2 Cal.3d 956 (Cal. 1970) (policy rationale for respondeat superior and application when travel time is part of the working day)
Hinojosa v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 8 Cal.3d 150 (Cal. 1972) (framework distinguishing ordinary commute from extraordinary employer‑required transit)
Ducey v. Argo Sales Co., 25 Cal.3d 707 (Cal. 1979) (refusal to apply required‑vehicle exception where employee not shown to be required to commute by personal car)
Huntsinger v. Glass Containers Corp., 22 Cal.App.3d 803 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (required‑vehicle exception applied where employee had to have car available daily for unplanned field work)
Lobo v. Tamco, 182 Cal.App.4th 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (availability and employer reliance can create triable issue even if vehicle use is infrequent)
Jorge v. Culinary Institute of America, 3 Cal.App.5th 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (declines to extend vehicle‑use exception where employee's ordinary commute had no connection to job duties on the accident day)