New York Republican State Committee v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 70 F. Supp. 3d 362

Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief invalidating and enjoining the SEC pay-to-play rule 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-5 as applied to state officials running for federal office.
SEC adopted the Challenged Rule in 2010 under the Investment Advisers Act to address pay-to-play concerns.
Rule prohibits an investment adviser from providing advisory services to a government entity within two years after making a political contribution to officials of that entity.
Plaintiffs initially targeted three SEC rules but later limited their challenge to § 275.206(4)-5 as it relates to state officials seeking federal office, and sought a preliminary injunction.
The District Court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that review of SEC rules under the Advisers Act is exclusive to the Court of Appeals.
The court noted issues with standing and potential supplemental declarations but dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, with the injunction request denied as moot.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court has subject matter jurisdiction.	New York Republican and Tennessee Republican rely on district-court review.	Section 213 strips district courts and vests exclusive review in the Court of Appeals for Adviser Act rules.	Lacks subject matter jurisdiction; exclusive appellate review contemplated.
Whether Section 213’s exclusive review applies to pre-enforcement rules under the Advisers Act.	Investment Company Institute provides wide Rule→Order review; district court should hear it.	Investment Company Institute controls scope, directing appellate review of rules.	Section 213 requires direct appeal to the Court of Appeals for Adviser Act rules.
Whether the plaintiffs have standing to challenge the rule.	Plaintiffs allege chill and donor-restriction harms.	Chill injuries by donors are insufficient to confer standing; asserted injuries not tied to covered officials.	Standing remains doubtful; however court disposes on jurisdictional grounds before resolving standing.

Investment Company Institute v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 551 F.2d 1270 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (direct-review precedent; ‘order’ may encompass review of regulations to avoid delay and bifurcation)
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (pre-enforcement review of a rule under the Advisers Act directly in the Circuit)
American Petroleum Institute v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Congress can override Investment Company Institute by explicit review provision)
Watts v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (APA-based definition of order; policy reasoning supportive of direct review but distinct)
Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (same-as policy-based context for direct appellate review when direct-review statute exists)
Am. Nat’l Auto. Dealers Ass’n v. FTC, 670 F.3d 268 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (default rule directing district-court review absent direct-review statute)
Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (judicial power is limited to authority conferred by statute)