New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Group Architecture & Eng., Inc. (Slip Opinion)
133 N.E.3d 482
Ohio2019Background
- New Riegel Local School District sued design and construction firms and a surety alleging defects (moisture, condensation, etc.) in a school substantially completed and occupied in December 2002.
- New Riegel asserted breach-of-contract, breach-of-express-warranty, and surety- bond claims; plaintiffs served notices in January 2015 and sued in April 2015.
- Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting R.C. 2305.131 (Ohio’s construction statute of repose) barred the claims because more than ten years had elapsed after substantial completion.
- Trial court granted defendants’ motions and dismissed New Riegel’s breach-of-contract claims as time-barred.
- The Third District reversed, relying on this court’s Kocisko decision holding the (earlier) statute of repose applied only to tort claims.
- Ohio Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the current R.C. 2305.131 applies to contract actions as well as torts and whether stare decisis compelled following Kocisko.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the current R.C. 2305.131 applies to contract claims as well as tort claims | New Riegel: statute should be read to apply only to torts; applying it to contract claims would be impotent because contract claims accrue earlier | Appellants: the statute’s language and uncodified legislative statements show it applies to any cause of action meeting its terms, including contract claims | Held: R.C. 2305.131 applies to causes of action in tort or contract that seek damages for bodily injury, injury to real/personal property, or wrongful death arising from a defective/unsafe improvement to real property |
| Whether stare decisis (Kocisko) requires treating the current statute as limited to torts | New Riegel: Kocisko controls because wording is substantially similar | Appellants: the statute was materially revised since Kocisko (multiple subdivisions, exceptions, remedial instruction), so stare decisis need not apply | Held: Stare decisis did not bar a fresh construction; the 2004 statute differs sufficiently from the 1971 version addressed in Kocisko |
| Whether the Court should decide if R.C. 2305.131 actually bars New Riegel’s claims on these facts (i.e., accrued-within-repose argument) | New Riegel: even if statute applies to contract claims, accrued-contract claims that vested within the ten-year period should not be barred | Appellants: statute of repose extinguishes liability after the repose period regardless of accrual | Held: Court declined to resolve whether R.C. 2305.131 bars these particular claims on the facts; remanded for the court of appeals to address remaining arguments |
| Whether statutory text and structure support inclusion of contract claims | New Riegel: statute’s injury-language is traditionally tort-focused; contract claims seek economic loss and are governed by separate limitation statutes | Appellants: statute references "notwithstanding other limitations" and defines "substantial completion" (a contract concept); it also carves out express-warranty (a contract concept), showing contract coverage | Held: Reading the statute as a whole supports application to contract claims; the express-warranty exception confirms the General Assembly contemplated contract concepts |
Key Cases Cited
- Kocisko v. Charles Shutrump & Sons Co., 21 Ohio St.3d 98 (1986) (earlier Ohio decision construing construction statute of repose to apply only to tort claims)
- Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 70 Ohio St.3d 460 (1994) (held the 1971 repose statute violated the Ohio Constitution where injury occurred after repose)
- Oaktree Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Hallmark Bldg. Co., 139 Ohio St.3d 264 (2014) (recognized R.C. 2305.131 as a statutory bar that can apply to accrued claims commenced after the statute’s effective date)
- CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1 (2014) (U.S. Supreme Court description of statutes of repose as absolute cutoff on right to sue)
