New Jersey v. Zuber
126 A.3d 335
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.2015Background
- Ricky Zuber committed two separate gang rapes in Nov. and Dec. 1981 at age 17; convicted in separate trials and received consecutive sentences totaling 110 years with 55 years parole ineligibility.
- Original aggregate sentence (150 years, 75 years parole ineligibility) was reduced on remand to 110/55. Zuber has been incarcerated since 1981 and brought a post-conviction motion after Graham.
- Zuber argued under Graham v. Florida that his aggregate term‑of‑years parole ineligibility is the functional equivalent of life without parole for a juvenile nonhomicide offender and therefore unconstitutional.
- Trial court denied relief in 2012; New Jersey Appellate Division reviewed de novo, assuming arguendo various extensions of Graham but ultimately applying life‑expectancy analysis.
- Court used CDC/NVSR life tables (most recent available at adjudication) to assess whether Zuber’s parole eligibility falls within his expected lifespan and held 55 years parole ineligibility did not deny a meaningful, realistic opportunity for release.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Zuber) | Defendant/State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retroactivity of Graham | Graham should apply to prior sentences | State did not contest retroactivity | Graham is retroactive under Teague first‑exception; review allowed |
| Whether Graham applies beyond literal LWOP to long term‑of‑years | Zuber: a term‑of‑years that effectively denies release for life equals LWOP | State: Graham applies only to literal LWOP or should be limited | Court assumed, without deciding, Graham could extend to term‑of‑years but did not need to rule definitively |
| Whether Graham bars aggregated consecutive sentences from multiple offenses/episodes | Zuber: aggregate consecutive terms that exceed life expectancy are functional LWOP | State: Graham did not address multi‑count consecutive terms; extension inappropriate | Court assumed such extension possible but did not decide; proceeded to substantive life‑expectancy test |
| Application to Zuber’s sentence | Zuber: 55 years parole ineligibility is effectively LWOP given race/age/life expectancy | State: Use current life tables for defendant’s age; 55 years falls within expected lifespan | Held: 55 years before eligibility still gives meaningful, realistic opportunity for release within predicted lifespan (parole eligibility ~age 72 vs. expected >80 in 2011 tables); sentence does not violate Graham |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (categorical ban on life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders; requires meaningful opportunity for release)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders unconstitutional; individualized sentencing required)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (juveniles less culpable for Eighth Amendment analysis)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (retroactivity framework for new constitutional rules)
- Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (rules prohibiting punishment of certain classes fall under Teague’s first exception)
- State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123 (1987) (Eighth Amendment principles applied in New Jersey; proportionality framework)
- People v. Caballero, 55 Cal.4th 262 (2012) (California decision holding aggregate term of years exceeding life expectancy can violate Graham)