New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. Y.N. (072804), 104 A.3d 244

Background

Y.N. ("Yvonne") learned she was four months pregnant while dependent on prescription opioids (Percocet); doctors advised against abrupt cessation and recommended methadone maintenance.
She enrolled in a bona fide methadone program one month before delivery; urine tests thereafter showed only methadone present.
Her newborn, P.A.C. ("Paul"), was born with neonatal abstinence syndrome (withdrawal from methadone), required NICU care and morphine, and was hospitalized for ~7 weeks.
The Division filed an abuse-and-neglect complaint alleging Yvonne’s prenatal drug history, refusal of one clinic drug test, the newborn’s withdrawal, and domestic-violence issues; the family court found abuse/neglect by a preponderance of the evidence.
The Appellate Division affirmed solely on the ground that the child suffered actual impairment from maternal methadone, treating harm as dispositive without evaluating parental fault or reasonableness.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the statute requires proof of parental fault (minimum degree of care; gross negligence or recklessness) and that harm alone—where the mother timely followed a bona fide, prescribed treatment—does not sustain an abuse-or-neglect finding absent exceptional circumstances.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b) allows an abuse/neglect finding based solely on a newborn’s methadone withdrawal	Harm to the child (actual impairment) is sufficient; caregiver intent or reasonableness is immaterial	Where mother timely entered a bona fide, prescribed methadone program after disclosure to clinicians, harm alone cannot establish abuse/neglect	Reversed App. Div.: statutory language requires parental fault; harm alone insufficient when mother timely followed prescribed treatment absent exceptional circumstances
Whether a parent’s participation in prescribed methadone treatment constitutes failure to exercise a minimum degree of care	Division: parental conduct caused impairment regardless of medical prescription	Yvonne: complying with medical advice is reasonable and may reduce overall harm; criminalizing treatment deters care-seeking	Held that minimum degree of care (at least gross negligence/recklessness) is an essential element; lawful medical treatment generally does not meet that standard
Whether prior decisions support treating harm as dispositive	Division relied on case law treating drug-exposed infants as evidence of risk/harm	Yvonne argued those cases are distinguishable because she sought medical treatment and the statute requires fault	Court distinguished prior cases and declined to extend them to impose strict liability for prescribed treatment
Whether hospitals must report neonatal abstinence from prescribed maternal treatment under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10	Division: significant withdrawal should trigger reporting/investigation	Yvonne: reporting obligation should not automatically apply to treatable, medically caused withdrawal	Court declined to decide: issue not properly raised or briefed and hospital was not a party; footnote has no precedential effect

Key Cases Cited

In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337 (1999) (parental-termination context; child born suffering withdrawal from heroin; not dispositive for Title Nine minimum-care analysis)
N.J. Dep’t of Children & Families v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1 (2013) (presence of substances in newborn insufficient by itself to prove abuse/neglect without proof of impairment or imminent risk)
N.J. Dep’t of Children & Families, Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. T.B., 207 N.J. 294 (2011) (statute requires failure to exercise minimum degree of care; minimum care requires gross negligence or recklessness)
State v. Tamburro, 68 N.J. 414 (1975) (interpreting DUI statute as strict liability for substances impairing driving; distinguished from Title Nine)
DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477 (2005) (statutory interpretation principles; courts adhere to plain statutory language)